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TRADE AND SECURITY AMONG THE RUINS
J. BENTON HEATH*
The collision of trade and security interests is taking place today in an
increasingly fragmented landscape. Governments’ conceptions of their own
vital interests are undergoing a rapid transformation as the concept of
“national security” expands to encompass issues such as national industrial
policy, cybersecurity, and responses to climate change and pandemic
disease. At the same time, the system for settling trade disputes is being
pulled apart by competing tendencies toward legalism and deformalization.
Last year, a landmark decision suggested that international adjudicators
could oversee this clash between security and trade, deciding which security
interests can override trade rules and which ones cannot. Then the collapse
of the WTO Appellate Body threw into doubt the future of a legalized trade
regime, suggesting a partial return to a system driven by politics.
I argue that this fragmented landscape provides an opportunity to
experiment with different ways of resolving the clash between trade and
security. After introducing the expansion of state security interests with
reference to recent policy developments, I identify three emerging models for
reconciling expanded security interests with trade obligations: structured
politics, trade legalism, and judicial managerialism. Each of these models
brings tradeoffs in terms of oversight and flexibility, and each is associated
with an ideal institutional setting. Rather than attempting to vindicate one
model for all settings and all purposes, we should embrace plurality,
especially at a moment where the relationship between trade and security
appears to be undergoing a historic transformation.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The clash between economic and security interests today is taking place
in an increasingly fragmented institutional landscape. In April 2019, a World
Trade Organization (WTO) dispute-settlement panel in Russia—Measures
Concerning Traffic in Transit (Russia—Transit) declared that it could review
and second-guess a state’s invocation of the WTO’s security exception,
marking what many considered a “constitutional moment” for the WTO.1
Months later, the WTO Appellate Body collapsed after years of obstruction
by the United States, heralding a much broader turn away from trade
legalism and a return to diplomacy- and power-based modes of dispute
settlement.2 This push-and-pull between adjudication and politics can be
seen in different configurations in other fora, as regional trade dispute
settlement mechanisms come online3 and states consider reforms to
investment law that would arguably make the system more responsive to
state interests.4
This fragmented landscape challenges the ability of international
economic law to respond to evolving state interests—particularly to those
interests considered most vital, such as national security. It is by now widely

1. E.g., Sungjoon Cho, A WTO’s ‘Kompetenz-Kompetenz’ Moment, INT’L ECON. L. & POL’Y
BLOG (Apr. 5, 2019), https://ielp.worldtradelaw.net/2019/04/a-wtos-kompetenz-kompetenzmoment.html.
2. See generally THE APPELLATE BODY OF THE WTO AND ITS REFORM (Chang-fa Lo, Junji
Nakagawa & Tsai-fang Chen eds., 2020); Gregory Shaffer, Tragedy in the Making? The Decline of Law
and the Return of Power in International Trade Relations, 44 YALE J. INT’L L. ONLINE 37 (2019).
3. See, e.g., Simon Lester & Inu Manak, The NAFTA/USMCA Panel Blocking Issue Looks Like It
Has Been Fixed (Probably), INT’L ECON. L. & POL’Y BLOG (Dec. 11, 2019),
https://ielp.worldtradelaw.net/2019/12/the-naftausmca-panel-blocking-issue-looks-like-it-has-beenfixed.html; EU Asks for Panel with Ukraine on Wood Export Ban, EUROPEAN COMM’N (June 21, 2019),
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=2034.
4. See, e.g., Anthea Roberts & Taylor St. John, UNCITRAL and ISDS Reform: Visualising a
Flexible Framework, EJIL TALK (Oct. 24, 2019), https://www.ejiltalk.org/uncitral-and-isds-reformvisualising-a-flexible-framework/.
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recognized that the relationship between economic liberalization and
national security is undergoing a profound reconfiguration.5 In the United
States, this shift is driven in part by a changing perception about the
relationship between free trade and the national interest.6 At the same time,
a number of other threats—including terrorism, transnational crime,
corruption, human rights violations, migration, pandemic disease, and
climate change—increasingly claim the mantle of “security” and are ever
more likely to overlap with economic rules.7 All of these new security
concerns can drive demands for exceptions to domestic and international
trade rules, and many have already done so.8 It remains to be seen how the
increasingly fragmented trade landscape will respond to the proliferation of
security interests.
In this contribution to the Duke Journal of Comparative & International
Law Symposium on National Security, I argue that there is some silver lining
among the ruins of the Appellate Body. In the wake of the Appellate Body’s
collapse, we can see different institutional forms emerging that offer
diverging approaches to reconciling emerging security interests with the
demands of a relatively globalized economy. The outlines of these emerging
forms can be found in the practice of dispute settlement panels, in treaty
language, and in policy proposals put forward at the WTO and in other fora.
This Article maps each of these emerging forms and identifies the tradeoffs
associated with them. Rather than attempting to vindicate one proposed
solution over the others, we should embrace the fact that we seem to be
entering a period of institutional experimentation and attempt to understand
the stakes. Given today’s uncertainty in political debates about trade’s
importance vis-à-vis other values, such experimentation is not an altogether
bad thing.
In advancing this argument, this paper is meant to serve as an Afterword
for my prior work on this subject.9 In an earlier piece, I argued that evolving
security interests pose a fundamental challenge to both political and legalist
models for managing the trade-security clash. I contended that “the
increasing overlap between national security and the global economy
5. See, e.g., J. Benton Heath, The New National Security Challenge to the Economic Order, 129
YALE L.J. 924 (2020); Kathleen Claussen, Old Wine in New Bottles? The Trade Rule of Law, 44 YALE J.
INT’L L. ONLINE 61, 63–64 (2019); Anthea Roberts, Henrique Choer Moraes & Victor Ferguson, Toward
a Geoeconomic Order in International Trade and Investment, 22 J. INT’L ECON. L. 655 (2019).
6. See generally Timothy Meyer & Ganesh Sitaraman, Trade and the Separation of Powers, 107
CAL. L. REV. 583 (2019).
7. J. Benton Heath, National Security and Economic Globalization: Toward Collision or
Reconciliation?, 42 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1431, 1433–39 (2019).
8. See infra Part I.
9. See generally Heath, supra note 5.
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requires us to consider the benefits of emerging strategies that mix politics
and law.”10 Since that article was finalized, the collapse of the Appellate
Body has focused attention on exactly these kinds of blended institutional
forms. In this fast-moving environment, it is not too soon to pause and take
stock of recent developments in national security policy and trade law.
The following discussion identifies three distinct modes of
reconciliation between trade and security measures. The WTO itself is
shifting to a version of “structured politics” rather than adjudication,
privileging diplomacy and power politics over legalism, though with a more
highly articulated institutional structure than what existed during the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) era.11 A second mode, which can
be identified in approaches that rely on ad hoc arbitration, would continue to
emphasize legalism and hard limits on national security carve-outs,
privileging trade governance over flexibility. A third mode, which is
reflected in some language found in the recent Russia—Transit case, appears
to steer a middle path between oversight and flexibility, stressing the role of
dispute settlement bodies in fostering adaptation and mutual learning. This
“judicial managerialist” approach to trade and security has yet to find an
institutional home, but it may be compatible with a range of contemplated
reforms to the WTO dispute settlement process, regional trade fora, and
investment law.
This paper proceeds in four parts. Part II describes three novel
conceptions of security that, in my view, are likely to pose significant
challenges for economic law in the near term, focusing on developments
taking place over the past two years. Parts III through V discuss each of the
three emerging modes of engagement, identifying the tradeoffs for evolving
security interests in terms of oversight, flexibility, and mutual learning. A
brief conclusion follows.
II. THE EVOLVING NATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGE
The period since the end of the Cold War has witnessed a dramatic
proliferation of national security interests.12 This is not to say that national
security was ever a tight or easily defined concept—contestation about its
meaning is at least as old as the national security state itself.13 But, at least
with respect to the security-trade nexus, the Cold War provided a notable
10. Id. at 1030.
11. This is particularly relevant to security concerns because there are signs that this mode is likely
to persist for “sensitive” issues even if the WTO Appellate Body is revived. See infra text accompanying
notes 137–140.
12. This and the next paragraph condense and restate an argument made in Heath, supra note 5.
13. See, e.g., OREN GROSS & FIONNUALA NÍ AOLÁIN, LAW IN TIMES OF CRISIS 214–20 (2006).
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degree of conceptual and practical stability. In general, governments tended
to argue that security concerns should override trade commitments only with
respect to interstate conflicts (such as wars or embargoes) or for import and
export controls relating to military readiness.14 This period of stability
outlasted the Cold War itself, but it now seems to be reaching its end.15
The transformation of national security has multiple sources.16 The
advent of human rights and terrorism as national security concerns has led to
the identification of new interstate adversaries, as well as non-state rivals.17
More recently, the United States has deployed anti-corruption norms for the
same purpose, asserting that corruption abroad is a threat to U.S. national
security and a national emergency.18 But the most expansive visions of
national security tend to involve what Laura Donohue has called “actor-less”
risks: phenomena that are caused not by a single governmental or non-state
adversary, but by diffuse interactions between humans and non-human
phenomena.19 These include climate change and environmental damage,
pandemic disease, and cyber vulnerabilities.
It is helpful, given this state of flux, not to be preoccupied with asking
which of these constitute “real” security interests.20 Security itself is
14. Heath, supra note 5, at 1054–55.
15. Id. at 1057–59.
16. See Diane Desierto, Protean ‘National Security’ in Global Trade Wars, Investment Walls, and
Regulatory Controls: Can ‘National Security’ Ever Be Unreviewable in International Economic Law?,
EJIL TALK (Apr. 2, 2018), https://www.ejiltalk.org/national-security-defenses-in-trade-wars-andinvestment-walls-us-v-china-and-eu-v-us.
17. See Ryan Goodman, Norms and National Security: The WTO as a Catalyst for Inquiry, 2 CHI.
J. INT’L L. 101 (2001); Philip Zelikow, The Transformation of National Security, THE NAT’L INTEREST,
Mar. 1, 2003.
18. See, e.g., E.O. 13692, Mar. 8, 2015, 80 Fed. Reg. 12747 (Mar. 11, 2015) (finding that “the
situation in Venezuela, including the Government of Venezuela’s erosion of human rights guarantees, . . .
as well as the exacerbating presence of significant public corruption, constitutes an unusual and
extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States,” and declaring a
national emergency). But see Gregory Korte, White House: States of Emergency Are Just Formalities,
USA TODAY (Apr. 9, 2015), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2015/04/09/pro-formastates-of-national-emergency/25479553 [https://perma.cc/VDP5-4AL3] (quoting a White House deputy
national security adviser as saying that, despite new emergency economic sanctions, “the United States
does not believe that Venezuela poses some threat to our national security. We, frankly, just have a
framework for how we formalize these executive orders”). These sanctions are currently the subject of a
WTO dispute. See Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Venezuela, United States—Measures
Relating to Trade in Goods and Services, WTO Doc. WT/DS574/2 (Mar. 15, 2019).
19. Laura K. Donohue, The Limits of National Security, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1573, 1709 (2011).
20. This is not to say that “security,” as used in a particular legal text, cannot be interpreted to have
hard legal boundaries; it certainly can. See, e.g., CC/Devas v. India, PCA Case No. 2013-09, Award on
Jurisdiction and Merits, ¶¶ 355, 371 (July 25, 2016) (interpreting “essential security interests” in a
bilateral investment treaty to be limited to military and quasi-military matters, thus avoiding overlap with
the “public purpose” prong of the treaty’s expropriation provision). But, by incorporating “security” as
an exception to trade agreements, states do appear to be reserving to themselves a wider range of
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helpfully viewed as an intersubjective and socially constructed concept,
wherein any matter can plausibly be “securitized” if an actor successfully
claims that extraordinary measures are necessary to address an existential
threat.21 Security, in domestic and international trade law, tends to follow
this exceptionalist logic, allowing governments to deviate from ordinary
trade rules whenever doing so serves a proclaimed security interest.22 An
investigation into the changing political demands around “security,”
however defined, thus reveals the kinds of pressures that security politics are
likely to place on trade and investment law.
This section identifies three trends that challenge traditional, militaryfocused notions of security from a variety of perspectives. First, domestic
industrial policy—meaning the protection of emerging or declining
industries—is increasingly taking on a national security cast, particularly in
the United States under President Trump. Second, the challenges of
technological interconnectedness have elevated “cybersecurity” to a national
security issue, with broad ramifications for all international commerce that
has a digital component (which is, increasingly, nearly all of it). Third,
climate change today is cast as the existential threat to end all others—a
security issue par excellence.
In addition to these threats, the Covid-19 outbreak of 2020 underscored
the ways in which pandemic disease challenges existing narratives of trade,
security, and globalization.23 Infectious diseases are a paradigmatic nonmilitary security threat, having been the object of a widely successful
transnational effort in the early 1990s and 2000s to establish new legal and
policy frameworks for “global health security.”24 The international response
to Covid-19 includes a range of extraordinary actions, including travel
restrictions, quarantine measures, lockdowns and enforced closure of
businesses, and export restrictions on critical protective equipment.25 The
discretion than for other, more subject-specific terms like “environment” or “labor.” And, even if
“security” in trade agreements is interpreted narrowly, understanding the malleability of this term in wider
political discourse reveals important tensions between international trade law and domestic politics.
21. BARRY BUZAN, OLE WAEVER & JAAP DE WILDE, SECURITY: A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR
ANALYSIS 23–31 (1998).
22. Kathleen Claussen, Trade’s Security Exceptionalism, 72 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020).
23. See, e.g., Anthea Roberts & Nicolas Lamp, Is the Virus Killing Globalization?: There Is No One
Answer, BARRON’S (Mar. 15, 2020).
24. See generally SARA E. DAVIES, ADAM KAMRADT-SCOTT & SIMON RUSHTON, DISEASE
DIPLOMACY: INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY (2015).
25. There are already suggestions that some of these measures could generate claims under
investment or trade treaties. See, e.g., Joost Pauwelyn, Export Resitriction in Times of Pandemic
(unpublished paper 2020), https://papers.ssrn/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3579965; Mona Pinchis
Paulsen, Thinking Creatively and Learning from Covid-19: How the WTO Can Maintain Open Trade on
Critcal Supples, OPINIO JURIS (Apr. 2, 2020), http://opiniojuris.org/2020/04/02/covid-19-symposium-
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crisis also may herald a longer-term shift in trade, as countries invoke
national security to justify policies aimed at unwinding global supply chains
and ensuring that essential supplies, including medicines and medical
devices, are manufactured domestically.26 Although it remains to be seen
how fundamentally the pandemic will affect the existing global order, state
responses to the outbreak are already reinforcing and accelerating the trends
identified in this section.
A. The Return of the Past: Industrial Policy as National Security
The return of industrial policy is among today’s most prominent
challenges to international trade and investment law.27 Today, governments
are frequently using the rhetoric of national security to explain and justify
policies designed to protect emerging or declining industries and to enable
international competitiveness. This raises the possibility that a wide range of
state intervention into the economy could be justified on security grounds,
or that trade itself could come to be seen as a threat to national security. The
tension between free trade and industrial policy thus poses an acute problem
for international institutions, particularly given skepticism of free trade from
leaders on both ends of the political spectrum.
Industrial policy, as used here, refers to a wide range of government
interventions designed to reallocate resources horizontally among sectors of
the economy.28 Such interventions can include subsidies, tariffs, product
standards, bans or quotas, bailouts, and nationalizations—all of which have
the potential to impact trade and to implicate trade rules.29 The fallout from
the 2008 global financial crisis triggered a renewed interest in industrial
policy among both academic observers and policymakers,30 and it was
argued that some form of horizontal reallocation across sectors had proven
thinking-creatively-and-learning-from-covid-19-how-the-wto-can-maintain-open-trade-on-criticalsupplies/; Michael Ostrove, Kate Brown de Bejar & Ben Sanderson, Covid-19: A Legitimate Basis for
Investor Claims?, DLA PIPER (Apr. 16, 2020), https://www.dlapiper.com/en/spain/insights/publications/
2020/04/covid-19-a-legitimat-basis-for-investment-claims/.
26. See, e.g., Samuel Esreicher & Jonathan F. Harris, Bring Home the Supple Chain, VERDICT (Apr.
15 2020) (“Once the COVID-19 pandemic subsides, U.S. policymakers . . . should mandate that a
minimum percentage of essential supplies be manufactured domestically. This is a national security
issue.”).
27. See, e.g., MARK FELDMAN, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT OBLIGATIONS AND INDUSTRIAL
POLICY: EVOLUTION IN TREATY PRACTICE (2018); Gregory Shaffer, Retooling Trade Agreements for
Social Inclusion, 2019 ILL. L. REV. 1, 39–41; Mark Wu & James Salzman, The Next Generation of Trade
and Environment Conflicts: The Rise of Green Industrial Policy, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 401 (2014).
28. TODD N. TUCKER, INDUSTRIAL POLICY AND PLANNING: WHAT IT IS AND HOW TO DO IT
BETTER 6 (2019).
29. See id. at 9.
30. See generally THE INDUSTRIAL POLICY REVOLUTION (Joseph E. Stiglitz & Justin Yifu Lin eds.,
2013).
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successful in emerging economies.31 Some authors began to tell revisionist
stories about industrial policy in the United States and other free-market
countries, contending that such policies were neither as rare nor as
ideologically anathema as often thought.32 As one prominent economist
wrote in 2010, “industrial policy is back.”33
The return of industrial policy is reconfiguring the established
relationship in market economies between national security and economic
liberalization. Of course, some subset of industrial policy is always
concerned with national security. For example, governments historically
used procurement, subsidies, and other means to support industries
considered essential for national defense, space exploration, and critical
infrastructure.34 The national-security justifications for these policies could
sometimes be specious, such as quotas imposed by the United States on
petroleum imports35 or Sweden’s claim that import restrictions on footwear
were necessary “to secure the provision of essential products necessary to
meet basic needs in case of war or other emergency in international
relations.”36 But, in general, state support for domestic industries needed to
be phrased in terms of military procurement or military readiness if it was

31. Dani Rodrik, Industrial Policy: Don’t Ask Why, Ask How, 1 M.E. DEV. J. 1 (2009).
32. E.g., Robert H. Wade, Return of Industrial Policy?, 26 INT’L REV. APP. ECON. 223, 229–32
(2012); Dan Ciuriak & John M. Curtis, The Resurgence of Industrial Policy and What It Means for
Canada, IRPP INSIGHT, June 2013, https://irpp.org/research-studies/the-resurgence-of-industrial-policyand-what-it-means-for-canada/.
33. Dani Rodrik, The Return of Industrial Policy, PROJECT SYNDICATE (Apr. 12, 2010),
https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-return-of-industrial-policy.
34. The tendency of such interventions to occupy ever-greater sections of the economy was noted
in 1963 by Lon Fuller, who thought that these developments raised “problems of institutional design
unprecedented in scope and importance,” in a passage that resonates today:
The problem of finding the most apt institutional design for governmental control over the
economy has been acute for a long time. In the future this problem is, I think, bound to become
more pressing and pervasive. Indispensable facilities, like certain of our railways, will have to
be rescued from their economic plight . . . . Almost by inadvertence—a multibillion dollar
inadvertence—we have developed a new form of mixed economy in that huge segment of
industry dependent upon contracts with the armed services. Because this new form of enterprise
is classified as “private,” it escapes the scrutiny to which direct governmental operation would
be subjected. At the same time it is foolish to think of it as being significantly subject to the
discipline of the market. When and if our expenditures for armaments are seriously reduced, a
great unmeshing of gears will have to take place. Finally, there are the as yet largely unfaced
dislocations that will be brought about by increasing automation.
LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 175–176 (rev. ed. 1969).
35. JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 752 (1969) (“United States oil
quotas . . . carry the label ‘security measure,’ but are widely considered to be protectionist.”).
36. Sweden—Import Restrictions on Certain Footwear, ¶ 4, GATT Doc. L/4250 (Nov. 17, 1975);
see also GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting, at 8-9, GATT Doc. C/M/109 (Nov. 10, 1975) (“Many
representatives . . . expressed doubts as to the justification of these measures under the General
Agreement.”).
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going to be considered a “security” policy.37 Autarky, on this view, is not
itself a security interest; free trade is not itself a security threat.38
This is consistent with broader views of trade that prevailed among
Western states during the postwar era. For the U.S. diplomats who drafted
the GATT, liberalized trade had long been associated with greater
international harmony, peace, and national security.39 This view proved
relatively persistent in U.S. policy circles. The 1987 Reagan White House’s
National Security Strategy explains that “encouraging regional and global
free-trade agreements” are a critical element of U.S. national security and
contribute to the containment of the Soviet Union.40 The Clinton White
House argued in 2000 that Chinese accession to the WTO was critical to
national security.41 And the Obama administration repeatedly argued that
entering the Trans-Pacific Partnership would enhance U.S. national
security.42 While this discussion has focused on the United States, supporters
of trade liberalization and the WTO worldwide frequently advance the
argument that trade agreements contribute to peace and security.43
This policy orientation was turned on its head with the election of
Donald Trump in 2016. The Trump administration promptly declared that
“economic security is national security,” adding:
For decades, the United States has allowed unfair trading practices to
grow. Other countries have used dumping, discriminatory non-tariff
barriers, forced technology transfers, non-economic capacity, industrial
subsidies, and other support from governments and state-owned
enterprises to gain economic advantages.
Today we must meet the challenge. We will address persistent trade
37. Heath, supra note 5, at 1054.
38. For an uncompromising argument to this effect in international trade law, see Michael Hahn,
Vital Interests and the Law of GATT: An Analysis of the GATT’s Security Exception, 12 MICH. J. INT’L
L. 558, 580 (1991) (“[I]t would be wrong to read article XXI as coping with dire socioeconomic
consequences ensuing from the operation of GATT principles and policies.”).
39. See generally Mona Pinchis-Paulsen, Trade Multilateralism and U.S. National Security: The
Making of the GATT Security Exception, MICH. J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2020) (arguing that the GATT
security exception reflected a qualified victory for members of the U.S. delegation who successfully
argued—against the perspective of their own armed services—that U.S. leadership on liberalized
international trade would further U.S. security interests).
40. WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES 3 (1987) [hereinafter
1987 NSS].
41. David E. Sanger, Sometimes, National Security Says It All, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2000. Notably,
the Reagan administration was not willing to support Soviet admission to the GATT in the 1980s, despite
the existence of similar arguments at the time. See 1987 NSS, supra note 40, at 10.
42. Raj Bhala, TPP, American National Security and Chinese SOEs, 16 WORLD TRADE REV. 655,
659–60 (2017) (quoting then-current and former U.S. officials).
43. See, e.g., Robert Howse, The Legitimacy of the World Trade Organization, in THE LEGITIMACY
OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 355, 369 (Jean-Marc Coicaud & Veijo Heiskanen eds. 2001)
(describing, but not adhering to, the “conflict management” approach to the WTO’s legitimacy).
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imbalances, break down trade barriers, and provide Americans new
opportunities to increase their exports. The United States will expand trade
that is fairer so that U.S. workers and industries have more opportunities
to compete for business.44

This language signals a shift in U.S. policy, whereby ever freer trade is
no longer presumed to result in security gains and U.S. national security is
instead preserved through trade policies that support and protect domestic
industry.45 Responding to these developments in the United States and
abroad, commentators have raised concerns that “[t]reating economic
security as national security may . . . create a permanent state of exception
justifying broad protection/protectionist measures across time and space.”46
In the United States, the most salient example of this new approach to
industrial-policy-as-national-security is the Trump administration’s decision
to impose tariffs on steel and aluminum imports.47 These tariffs expressly
relied on a strong form of “security exceptionalism,” both under domestic
law and international law, to avoid the domestic and international legal
constraints that would otherwise apply to such trade restrictions.48
Domestically, the tariffs rely on Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of
1962, which enables the President to take action to “adjust” imports of a
certain product “so that such imports will not threaten to impair the national
security.”49 To defend these tariffs at the WTO, the United States has also
invoked Article XXI of the GATT, which recognizes a state’s right to take
“any action which it considers necessary for the protection of its essential
security interests” under certain enumerated circumstances.50 By invoking
these exceptions, the United States has edged toward a version of national
security that goes beyond military readiness, to embrace a conception that
equates security with economic self-sufficiency and competitiveness.51 This
44. WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES 17, 19 (2017).
45. See, e.g., Roberts, Moraes & Ferguson, supra note 5, at 664–65.
46. Id. at 665.
47. E.g., TUCKER, supra note 28, at 7 (citing Trump’s support for the steel industry as an example
of industrial policy).
48. Claussen, supra note 22, at 24–25 (describing these measures as a form of “hard” security
exceptionalism).
49. 19 U.S.C. § 1862(c)(1)(A). “National security” is not defined in the statute, and the text
mandates a range of considerations that blend economic and security concerns, including the capacity of
domestic industries, their growth requirements, the national economic welfare, the impact of foreign
competition on “individual” domestic industries, and the effect of imports on the workforce, government
revenue, job skills, and investment. Id. § 1862(d).
50. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XXI, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S.
194 [hereinafter GATT 1947].
51. See Presidential Proclamation on Adjusting Imports of Steel into the United States, ¶ 8, Mar. 8,
2018 (“This relief will help our domestic steel industry to revive idled facilities, open closed mills,
preserve necessary skills by hiring new steel workers, and maintain or increase production, which will
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approach connects national security to far older conceptions of industrial
policy, often with the same racist and gendered views about which jobs and
economic sectors merit government support.52
All this is not to say that industrial policy is the exclusive province of
the populist-nationalist right. There appears to be growing enthusiasm
among progressives in the United States for some form of industrial policy
to address inequality, invest in disadvantaged communities, catalyze
innovation, and restart domestic manufacturing.53 It is frequently argued that
“green industrial policy”—consisting in large measure of subsidies for the
development of green technology—is necessary to facilitate investment in
risky ventures and counteract the market’s mispricing of carbon emissions.54
For example, certain types of subsidies and local content requirements may
be the most politically effective ways to build support for green energy
programs, particularly in places like the United States where publics are wary
of top-down governance by international institutions.55 Separately, domestic
industrial policy is shaping cybersecurity and digital commerce, as states
intervene to support domestic industries and identify national champions,

reduce our Nation’s need to rely on foreign producers for steel and ensure that domestic producers can
continue to supply all the steel necessary for critical industries and national defense. Under current
circumstances, this tariff is necessary and appropriate to address the threat that imports of steel articles
pose to the national security.”); U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, THE EFFECT OF IMPORTS OF STEEL ON THE
NATIONAL SECURITY 55–57 (Jan. 11, 2018) (referring to the effect of a declining steel industry on U.S.
“surge capability” in time of “extended conflict or national emergency,” while also stressing that global
excess capacity in steel are “weakening our internal economy”).
52. Compare TUCKER, supra note 28, at 25 (noting the “racially exclusionary” nature of New Dealera industrial policies), with Nicolas Lamp, How Should We Think About the Winners and Losers from
Globalization?: Three Narratives and their Implications for the Redesign of International Economic
Agreements, at 10–12 Queen’s Univ. Faculty of Law Res. Paper Ser., No. 2018-102 (Aug. 2019) (“The
deeply gendered nature of Trump’s narrative becomes even more evident in a crucial omission: Trump
consistently fails to mention the textile industry, even though textile workers have been affected by import
competition in much greater numbers than those in the coal and steel industry. A key difference between
the coal and steel industry, on the one hand, and the textile industry, on the other hand, is that the textile
industry predominantly employs women.”).
53. E.g., GANESH SITARAMAN, THE GREAT DEMOCRACY 166 (2019) (“The United States . . .
should also engage in an industrial policy that invests in communities across the country. This industrial
policy would jump-start areas with investments in research and development and infrastructure and
require that manufacturing take place in the United States when products are built on breakthroughs from
public investments in R&D.”); TUCKER, supra note 28, at 30–39 (outlining considerations for an
industrial policy focused on federalized planning, sustainable development, and support for women and
communities of color).
54. DANI RODRIK, STRAIGHT TALK ON TRADE 257–60 (2017); see also Salzman & Wu, supra note
27, at 416–42; Dani Rodrik, Green Industrial Policy, 30 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 469 (2014).
55. See Timothy Meyer, How Local Discrimination Can Promote Global Public Goods, 95
BOSTON UNIV. L. REV. 1937 (2015); Todd Tucker, There’s a Big New Headache for the Green New Deal,
WASH. POST, June 28, 2019.

HEATH (DO NOT DELETE)

234

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

5/16/2020 9:03 AM

[Vol 30:223

sometimes touching off economic and geopolitical conflict.56 Most recently,
the Covid-19 pandemic has produced calls on the American right and left for
“a serious industrial policy to reclaim and rebuild domestic supply chains.”57
Unlike the Trump administration’s steel and aluminum tariffs,
progressive industrial policy has yet to be justified by reference to “essential
security” concerns before an international tribunal, though that could change.
Industrial policies can implicate a range of applicable domestic and
international laws, only some of which are subject to the kind of broad
security exceptions that the United States is invoking with respect to the steel
tariffs.58 The more fundamental point, however, is that an increasing range
of regulatory techniques designed to support domestic industry are being tied
to national security, and not just in the United States.59 The securitization of
industrial policy is thus poised to precipitate further clashes with trade rules.
B. The Untenable Present: Cybersecurity, National Security, and the Future
of Commerce
Cybersecurity, today, is widely understood to be essential to national
security,60 even if the concept itself remains somewhat slippery.61 The notion
that cybersecurity demands extraordinary measures appears to enjoy broad
support from lawmakers across the political spectrum, not to mention
intuitive appeal among the lay public. This is also a policy area in which state
governments have been particularly active, intervening to restrict crossborder data flows; unwind transactions involving sensitive personal data;
impose technical and regulatory standards; restrict certain foreign companies
from entering sensitive sectors; and even negotiate new trade rules in
56. E.g., Vinod K. Aggarwal & Andrew W. Reddie, Comparative Industrial Policy and
Cybersecurity: A Framework for Analysis, 3 J. CYBER POL’Y 291 (2018).
57. Robert Kuttner, Trump’s Economy Goes Viral, AM. PROSPECT (Mar. 4, 2020); accord Marco
Rubio, We Need a More Resilient American Economy, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2020).
58. Compare Salzman & Wu, supra note 27, at 451–54 (arguing that many green industrial policies
implicate the WTO Subsidies and Countervailing Measures agreement, which, on its face, lacks an
exception for either security or environmental measures), with Meyer, supra note 55, at 1993–2001
(analyzing local content requirements largely under the GATT).
59. See, e.g., Aggarwal & Reddie, supra note 56, at 296 (noting that U.S., Chinese, Finnish, and
French policies emphasize that national security considerations drive standard setting, procurement, and
public investment in the cybersecurity market); Salzman & Wu, supra note 28, at 415 (finding that
governments are emphasizing the national security benefits of green industrial policies).
60. See, e.g., Jim Garamone, Cyber Tops List of Threats to U.S., Director of National Intelligence
Says, DOD NEWS (Feb. 13, 2018), https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/1440838/
cyber-tops-list-of-threats-to-us-director-of-national-intelligence-says/.
61. For critical reviews of the cybersecurity discourse, noting shifts among frames and referent
objects, see Helen Nissenbaum, Where Computer Security Meets National Security, 7 ETHICS & INFO.
TECH. 61 (2005); Lene Hansen & Helen Nissenbaum, Digital Disaster, Cyber Security, and the
Copenhagen School, 53 INT’L STUDS. Q. 1155 (2009).
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bilateral, regional, and multilateral fora specifically relating to data
transfers.62 Despite these efforts to innovate new rules and policies, the
existing frameworks governing the intersection of electronic commerce and
security imperatives are woefully undertheorized, and they all essentially
punt on the question of whether and when cybersecurity concerns should
override the demands of trade liberalization (or vice versa). The result is an
untenable present—an unstable and tense state of affairs that must give way
to some future, yet-to-be-understood equilibrium.
Cybersecurity, as it relates to international trade and investment, in fact
refers to a bundle of different threats, each suggesting a different set of policy
responses. These threats have been said to include intrusions into systems
belonging to militaries, defense or intelligence agencies, or their suppliers;
cyberattacks on critical infrastructure, such as power networks, hospitals, or
telecommunications; “economic cyber-espionage” operations aimed at
stealing intellectual property and trade secrets or disrupting competitors; or
the manipulation of digital information to create distrust.63 Today, this list of
potential security threats must also include the collection of sensitive
personal data by private or state-owned firms, which governments are
increasingly viewing as a national security concern in itself, without
necessarily demanding any further connection to espionage, sabotage, or
warfare.64
In response to these threats, states are imposing measures in the name
of national security that significantly impact cross-border trade and
investment. The most prominent examples of such measures tend to involve
Chinese firms, particularly the global telecommunications giant Huawei.65
62. On the various regulatory paradigms for digital commerce, see Thomas Streinz, Digital
Megaregulation Uncontested?: TPP’s Model for the Global Digital Economy, in MEGAREGULATION
CONTESTED: GLOBAL ECONOMIC ORDERING AFTER TPP 312 (Benedict Kingsbury et al. eds., 2019).
63. Joshua Meltzer, Cybersecurity and Digital Trade: What Role for International Trade Rules?,
(Brookings Glob. Econ. & Dev. Working Paper No. 132, 2019).
64. E.g., Carl O’Donnell, Liana B. Baker & Echo Wang, Exclusive: Told U.S. Security At Risk,
Chinese Firm Seeks to Sell Grindr Dating App, REUTERS, Mar. 27, 2019; Samm Sacks et al., China’s
Cybersecurity Reviews for ‘Critical’ Systems Add Focus on Supply Chain, Foreign Control, DIGICHINA,
May 24, 2019.
65. Huawei was identified last year by some outlets as “the world’s largest telecom equipment
company,” and is a recognized global leader in the development of 5G telecommunications technology.
Keith Johnson & Elias Groll, The Improbable Rise of Huawei, FOREIGN POL’Y, Apr. 3, 2019. It is not
technically owned by the Chinese government, instead referring to itself as “employee-owned,” but the
reality appears to be more complicated. See Christopher Balding & Donald Clarke, Who Owns Huawei?
(unpublished manuscript, Apr. 17, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3372669;
cf. Curtis J. Milhaupt & Wentong Zheng, Beyond Ownership: State Capitalism and the Chinese Firm,
103 GEO. L.J. 665, 688 (2015) (arguing that, in China, “[t]he state has only attenuated control over stateowned enterprises, yet it exerts significant control rights over private firms in which it holds no ownership
interests”).
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In August 2018, Australia banned Huawei and the Chinese company ZTE
from providing 5G equipment on its territory, citing concerns about the
security of critical infrastructure.66 The following year, the United States
declared a national emergency with respect to exploitation by “foreign
adversaries” of telecommunications networks and invoked statutory
emergency powers to review and prohibit technology transactions that pose
an “unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States.”67 This
order was widely understood to be meant “to ban Huawei equipment in 5G
networks, but it could end up having a much broader use than that.”68
Elsewhere, other countries are wrestling with whether to ban Huawei
equipment,69 admit Huawei,70 or attempt a middle road between openness
and an outright ban.71 China has decried the Australian and U.S. measures as
violations of WTO rules that prohibit discrimination and forbid quantitative
restrictions.72
States are also beginning to use national-security authority to regulate
the collection, aggregation, and transfer of personal data. This is particularly
pronounced in the United States, where the interagency Committee on
Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) has opened high-profile
investigations into the online video app TikTok and the LGBTQ dating app
Grindr, forcing Grindr’s Chinese owner to divest its holdings by later this
year.73 The reported rationale for the Grindr action was that users’ personal
data “could be exploited by Beijing to blackmail individuals with security
66. E.g., Jamie Smyth, Australia Banned Huawei over Risks to Key Infrastructure, FIN. TIMES,
Mar. 27, 2019.
67. E.O. 13873, May 15, 2019, 84 Fed. Reg. 22689 (May 15, 2019). Proposed regulations issued
in late 2019 do not provide any further definition of the “national security” concerns at issue. See Securing
the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain, 84 Fed. Reg. 65316,
65320–22 (Nov. 27, 2019).
68. Samm Sacks & Graham Webster, The Trump Administration’s Approach to Huawei Risks
Repeating China’s Mistakes, SLATE (May 21, 2019), https://slate.com/technology/2019/05/u-s-chinahuawei-executive-order-foreign-adversary-national-security.html.
69. Katrin Bennhold & Jack Ewing, In Huawei Battle, China Threatens Germany ‘Where It Hurts’:
Automakers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2020, at A1.
70. Huawei: Which Countries Are Blocking Its 5G Technology?, BBC NEWS (May 18, 2019),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-48309132.
71. See, e.g., Joel P. Trachtman, The Internet of Things Cybersecurity Challenge to Trade and
Investment: Trust and Verify? (Apr. 18, 2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (describing
the approach taken by the U.K.).
72. James Politi, China Hits Out at US over Huawei Blacklisting at WTO Meeting, FIN. TIMES
(May 28, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/978f169a-8175-11e9-b592-5fe435b57a3b; China Warns
Australia at WTO about 5G Restriction, REUTERS (Apr. 12, 2019, 12:09 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-huawei-australia-china-wto/china-warns-australia-at-wto-about-5grestriction-idUSKCN1RO20H.
73. Louise Matsakis, TikTok Is Having a Tough Time in Washington, WIRED (Nov. 5, 2019),
https://www.wired.com/story/tiktok-rough-time-washington/; O’Donnell, Baker & Wang, supra note 64
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clearances.”74 The view that personal data poses a national-security risk also
appears to enjoy broad political support. In 2018, Congress expanded
CFIUS’s mandate to, among other things, review any foreign investment in
any U.S. business that “maintains or collects sensitive personal data” of U.S.
citizens.75 The actions of investment-screening mechanisms like CFIUS, if
not justified by security exceptions, could implicate obligations in the GATT
and the General Agreement on Trade in Services, as well as investmenttreaty guarantees of non-discrimination, expropriation, and fair treatment,
where applicable.76
Existing trade agreements are, at best, ill-suited to dealing with the
challenge of cybersecurity measures. The 1947 GATT, which provides the
template for the security exception in many trade agreements, was designed
in a time long before contemporary cyber-threats, referring instead to
“fissionable materials,” “implements of war,” military supplies, and “war or
other emergency in international relations.”77 Lawyers could argue endlessly
about whether cybersecurity measures such as those described above are
“taken in time of . . . emergency in international relations,” or relate to the
supply of a “military establishment,” but the fit is obviously less than ideal.78

74. Georgia Wells & Kate O’Keeffe, U.S. Orders Chinese Firm to Sell Dating App Grindr Over
Blackmail Risk, WALL ST. J., Mar. 27, 2019.
75. Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-232,
§ 1703(a)(4)(B)(iii)(III), 132 Stat. 2178 (2018). Subsequent regulations explained that this provision
covers, among other things, any business that maintains or collects certain types of data, including
financial, health, email and chat data, on more than one million persons, or plans to do so. Provisions
Pertaining to Certain Investments in the United States by Foreign Persons, 85 Fed. Reg. 3112, 3132 (Jan.
17, 2020) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 800). The drive to protect personal data, potentially on national
security grounds, is not unique to the United States. In 2019, China released draft rules for the “security
assessment” of outbound data transfers involving personal data. Qiheng Chen et al., Translation:
Personal Information Outbound Transfer Security Assessment Measures (Draft for Comment),
DIGICHINA (June 13, 2019), https://www.newamerica.org/cybersecurity-initiative/digichina/blog/
translation-new-draft-rules-cross-border-transfer-personal-information-out-china/. And even the
European Commission, which has been especially critical of expansive national security claims, has
anchored its policies relating to data privacy “ultimately on the Commission’s many concerns about EU
Members’ regional, national, and economic security.” Desierto, supra note 16.
76. James Mendenhall, The Evolution of the Essential Security Exception in U.S. Trade and
Investment Agreements, in SOVEREIGN INVESTMENT 311, 347 (Karl P. Sauvant, Lisa E. Sachs & Wouter
P.F. Schmit Jongbloed eds., 2012).
77. See GATT 1947, supra note 50, art. XXI(b); Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement
[CETA], art. 28.6, Can.-E.U., Oct. 2016, Official Journal of the E.U., L 11 (Jan. 14, 2017); General
Agreement on Trade in Services [GATS], art. XIV bis, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 196; Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights [TRIPS], art. 73, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S.
299, 331; North American Free Trade Agreement [NAFTA], art. 2102, Can.-Mex.-U.S., Dec. 17, 1992,
32 I.L.M. 605 (1993).
78. See Neha Mishra, The Trade-(Cyber)security Dilemma and Its Impact on Global Cybersecurity
Governance, J. WORLD TRADE (forthcoming 2020) (arguing that the GATS security exception does not
cover most cybersecurity measures, placing panels in a politically difficult position); Meltzer, supra note
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Some treaty drafters—including the United States, India, and parties to the
Trans-Pacific Partnership—have responded to this ill fit by allowing a state
to invoke the security exception for any measure “it considers necessary for
the . . . protection of its own essential security interests,” without regard to
war, emergency, or military supplies.79 This streamlined formulation, as Josh
Meltzer notes, “would seem to provide scope for justifying most, if not all,
cybersecurity measures.”80
This doctrinal confusion poses a particular problem for the development
of new international commerce. From the perspective of cybersecurity, some
security exceptions—such as the GATT formulation—appear outmoded or
ill-suited to address contemporary realities. Meanwhile, more recent
exceptions, such as the formulation now preferred by the United States,
would appear to provide carte blanche for cybersecurity measures to
override trade rules. Notably, these more flexible and open-ended security
exceptions appear in the same agreements, such as the CPTPP and the recent
U.S.-Mexico-Canada agreement, that are also meant to supply state-of-theart rules for digital trade.81 In other words, states are writing new trade rules
for the digital economy, but, given the breadth of today’s cybersecurity
concerns, it’s not clear when those rules will apply.
The recent U.S.-Japan digital trade agreement is a case in point.82 This
treaty collects all of the United States’ newest innovations with respect to
electronic commerce and the free flow of data. It provides for nondiscrimination against each parties’ digital products, prohibits measures
requiring the localization of servers, and provides that cross-border data
transfers can be limited only “to achieve a legitimate public policy objective”
in a non-discriminatory and narrowly tailored manner.83 It also contains an
innovative provision on cryptography, which essentially prohibits either

63, at 21 (arguing that “the absence of an emergency in international relations between the U.S. and China
as outlined by the Panel in Russia-Transit, would seem to foreclose genuine cybersecurity measures being
justified under the GATS or GATT security exception”); Trachtman, supra note 71 (arguing that “highrisk” measures, but not “low risk ones,” are probably justifiable under both prongs of GATT Article XXI).
79. United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement [USMCA], Can.-Mex.-U.S., art. 32.2, Nov. 30,
2018, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/united-states-mexico-canada-agreement/
agreement-between; Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership [CPTPP],
art. 29.2(b), Mar. 8, 2018, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/united-states-mexicocanada-agreement/agreement-between.
80. Meltzer, supra note 63, at 26.
81. See generally Streinz, supra note 62 (referencing the CPTPP and USMCA as examples of
where the “U.S. digital trade agenda” was featured).
82. Agreement Concerning Digital Trade, U.S.-Japan, Oct. 7, 2019, https://ustr.gov/countriesregions/japan-korea-apec/japan/us-japan-trade-agreement-negotiations/us-japan-trade-agreement-text
[hereinafter U.S.-Japan Digital Trade Agreement].
83. Id. arts. 8, 11, 12.

HEATH(DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

5/16/2020 9:03 AM

TRADE AND SECURITY AMONG THE RUINS

239

government demand that a company hand over the keys to its encrypted
systems as a condition of doing business and includes a handful of narrowly
drawn exceptions.84 None of these provisions, however, precludes a party
from “applying measures that it considers necessary for . . . the protection of
its own essential security interests.”85 Given the broad scope of the security
exception and the range of cybersecurity measures that could be justified in
this way, it is unclear to what extent the two countries have agreed to
anything of substance in the rest of the treaty.
This is the untenable present of cybersecurity and trade. For advocates
of free trade and free data flows, the growing cybersecurity challenge
threatens to wipe out all of the gains achieved through the adoption of rules
that limit server localization measures and ensure the cross-border transit of
data. But, for those seeking assurance that trade agreements will not interfere
with cybersecurity measures, this state of affairs is not much better. The
relationship between trade norms and security exceptions is too
underdeveloped to provide that degree of certainty.
C. The Looming Future: Climate Change and Security
The next challenge to the trade/security balance may come from an
entirely different vector. Despite the persistence—for now—of climate
denialism on the American political right, governments and populations are
increasingly recognizing the catastrophic risks posed by global climate
change.86 To date, there is no known case where a government has sought to
escape trade and investment rules by invoking its security interests relating
to climate change. But the incentives to do so exist, and as the salience of
this issue increases, states may perceive economic, legal, or political benefit
in doing so.
There appears to be growing consensus among governments that
climate change poses a security risk, though the precise nature of this risk
remains contested.87 By 2009, the Canadian, U.K., and U.S. national security
strategies all identified climate change as a threat.88 President Obama’s
second term placed a sharp emphasis on the dangers of climate change, with
84. Id. art. 21.
85. Id. art. 4.
86. See e.g., John R. Allen & David G. Victor, Opinion, Despite What Trump Says, Climate Change
Threatens Our National Security, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 7, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/07/
opinion/climate-change-national-security.html.
87. Matt McDonald, Climate Change and Security: Towards Ecological Security?, 10 INT’L
THEORY 153, 153 (2018).
88. Inv. Div., Directorate for Fin. & Enter. Affairs, OECD, SECURITY-RELATED TERMS IN
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND IN NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGIES, 14 (May 2009) (referring
to Canada and UK policies); National Security Strategy, WHITE HOUSE (Feb. 2015).
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the president asserting that “climate change constitutes a serious threat to
global security, an immediate risk to our national security”89 and Secretary
of State John Kerry announcing steps to “integrate climate and security
analysis into overall foreign policy planning.”90 Though the policies did not
always match the rhetoric, Obama at times seemed intent on subverting the
traditional security mindset, stating that the terrorist group “ISIS is not an
existential threat to the United States . . . . Climate change is a potential
existential threat to the entire world if we don’t do something about it.”91 As
the Trump administration has sought to de-prioritize climate change in favor
of vilifying migrants and using emergency powers to build a border wall,92
the climate-security narrative has become even more salient among the
center-left.93
These developments dovetail with changes at the international level,
where there is an increasing push to declare climate change a threat to
“international peace and security” under the U.N. Charter, potentially
triggering emergency powers on the international stage.94 The U.N. Security
Council opened this door somewhat in 2014, when it declared that an Ebola
outbreak constituted a threat to international peace and security, thus
suggesting that other non-human threats may qualify.95 Some countries have
encouraged the Security Council to take a more active role in threats like

89. President Barack Obama, Remarks at the U.S. Coast Guard Academy (May 20, 2015), https://
obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/05/20/remarks-president-united-states-coastguard-academy-commencement.
90. Secretary of State John Kerry, Remarks on Climate Change and National Security, Old
Dominion Univ., Norfolk, Va. (Nov. 10, 2015), https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/
2015/11/249393.htm.
91. Jeffrey Goldberg, The Obama Doctrine, THE ATLANTIC, (Apr. 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/.
92. See, e.g., Juliet Eilperin & Missy Ryan, White House Prepares to Scrutinize Intelligence
Agencies’ Finding that Climate Change Threatens National Security, WASH. POST, Feb. 20, 2019. For a
dicussion of who feared at the time that border emergency declaration would encourage Democrats to
later declare climate emergency, see Peter Baker, Trump Declares a National Emergency, and Provokes
a Constitutional Clash, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2019).
93. See, e.g., Janet Napolitano & Karen Breslau, The Real National Emergencies Trump is
Ignoring, POLITICO (Feb. 19, 2019), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2019/02/19/trumpnational-emergency-225163.
94. Shirley V. Scott, Implications of Climate Change for the UN Security Council, 91 INT’L AFF.
1317, 1333 (2015); Andreas Motzfeldt Kravik, The Security Council and Climate Change – Too Hot to
Handle?, ELIJ: TALK (Apr. 26, 2018), https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-security-council-and-climate-changetoo-hot-to-handle/.
95. See S.C. Res. 2177, prmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/2177 (Sept. 18, 2014); Gian Luca Burci, Ebola,
the Security Council and the Securitization of Public Health, 10 QUESTIONS IN INT’L L. 27, 27 (2014); J.
Benton Heath, Pandemics and other Health Emergencies, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW OF GLOBAL SECURITY (Robin Geiss & Nils Melzer ed.) (forthcoming 2020).
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climate change,96 though consensus at the Council has so far been limited to
deeming climate change a “threat multiplier.”97 All of these high-level
developments are matched by the rhetoric of transnational social
movements, which have increasingly used “emergency” language to define
the climate threat.98 Given these moves to redefine “international peace and
security” under the U.N. Charter, it is notable that some regional trade
treaties have begun to provide states with more flexibility to act in
accordance with their own understandings of their Charter obligations.99
It is still unclear where all this rhetoric leads, but commentators have
identified a range of climate policies that might interfere with trade or
investment and be justified on national security grounds. Despite the
European Union’s recent skepticism of expansive security claims, one EU
trade lawyer has suggested that “climate change and environmental issues .
. . may under certain circumstance become a matter related to the very
existence of a nation,” as in the case of island states affected by sea-level
rise.100 Other commentators allow a wider scope, suggesting countries could
use a climate-emergency declaration to suspend oil drilling, restrict trucking
or other fossil fuel-intensive activities, or impose sanctions or other
restrictions on traffic in fossil fuels.101
There is also the possibility that future governments will seek the broad

96. See, e.g., Michelle Müntefering, Minister of State, Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic
of Germany to the United Nations, Statement in the UNSC Open Debate: Upholding the United Nations
Charter (Jan. 9, 2020), https://new-york-un.diplo.de/un-en/news-corner/200109-un-charter/2291676.
97. Climate Change Recognized as ‘Threat Multiplier,’ UN Security Council Debates Its Impact
on Peace, U.N. NEWS (Jan. 25, 2019), https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/news/climate-changerecognized-%E2%80%98threat-multiplier%E2%80%99-un-security-council-debates-its-impact-peace.
98. See, e.g., Anne Barnard, A ‘Climate Emergency’ was Declared in New York City. Will that
Change Anything?, N.Y. TIMES (July 5, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/05/nyregion/climateemergency-nyc.html; Mark Tutton, UK Parliament Declares ‘Climate Emergency’, CNN (May 1, 2019,
5:46 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/05/01/europe/uk-climate-emergency-scn-intl/index.html.
99. Historically, trade treaties contained “essential security” exceptions for actions taken pursuant
to U.N. Charter obligations, but these were not self-judging, meaning that in principle it would be for a
trade panel or tribunal to decide whether an action was truly necessary to comply with a given Charter
obligation. GATT 1947, supra note 46, art. XXI(c). This has changed, particularly in treaties involving
the United States, where the security exceptions permit any action that either state “considers” necessary
for its Charter obligations. See U.S. MODEL BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY, art. 18 (U.S. DEP’T OF
STATE 2012); CPTPP, supra note 79, art. 29.2(b).
100. George-Dian Balan, On Fissionable Cows and the Limits to the WTO Security Exceptions, 14
GLOBAL TRADE & CUSTOMS J. 1, 6 & n.36 (2019).
101. The arguments of which I am aware have been deployed largely in the context of U.S. statutes
like the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. See Daniel A. Farber, Using Emergency Powers
to Fight Climate Change, LEGAL PLANET (Jan. 14, 2019), https://bit.ly/2GkdfYs; Mark Nevitt, Climate
Change: Our Greatest National Security Threat?, JUST SECURITY (Apr. 17, 2019),
https://bit.ly/2UvCvPq. The same arguments used to invoke emergency power domestically would likely
have to be deployed at the international level to justify departures from trade rules.
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protection of security exceptions for “ordinary” environmental measures
relating to climate change. Generally, such regulations, insofar as they
interfere with trade, are justified under public-policy exceptions such as
GATT Article XX, which require that measures be “necessary” for a
particular purpose and not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminatory.102
These exceptions are in principle available for environmental or
conservation measures, though such measures often fail to pass the test, at
least initially.103 There is thus concern that some legitimate environmental
measures—such as Border Carbon Adjustments designed to ensure that
domestic environmental regulations are not undermined by foreign
imports—could struggle to actually pass the test under these exceptions.104
Security exceptions, if available and supported by a widening consensus on
the threat of climate change, may provide an alternative that is not subject to
the same close, administrative-law-like scrutiny.
To this point, this discussion of climate and security has largely adopted
the perspective of the Western developed world, but the next challenge could
just as easily come from the Global South. For example, the trade policy
community has long understood that “[t]he ability to feed one’s own nation
is sometimes considered to be an important national goal for security
purposes.”105 Climate change is likely to put increasing pressure on global
food security in the coming years, with the hardest changes being felt by
some of the poorest countries.106 While protectionist measures can often
exacerbate food insecurity, trade restrictions may sometimes be justified in
order to insulate localized regions from the double shock of exposure to both

102. See GATT 1947, supra note 50, art. XX.
103. Compare DANI RODRIK, THE GLOBALIZATION PARADOX 71 (2011) (noting that WTO
Appellate Body rulings against environmental and other regulations “raised the ire of anti-globalization
advocates and made the WTO a dirty word in many circles,” demonstrated the “absence of a clear bright
line between where domestic prerogatives end and external obligations begin,” and contributed to “the
trade regime’s growing legitimacy crisis”), with Robert Howse, The World Trade Organization 20 Years
On: Global Governance by Judiciary, 27 EUR. J. INT’L L. 9, 51 (2016) (arguing that WTO Appellate
Body jurisprudence on environmental and other public policy measures has balanced the need to “make
assurances of policy space to establish and enhance its legitimacy in an era when neo-liberal globalization
is highly contested” with the concomitant need to place “constraints on protectionist abuse of public
policies that undermined the value or integrity of the basic GATT-like commitments”).
104. See Michael A. Mehling et al., Designing Border Carbon Adjustments for Enhanced Climate
Action, 113 AM. J. INT’L L. 433, 464–70 (2019) (explaining that BCAs would have to be carefully
designed to pass muster under the GATT Article XX exceptions); ECONOMIST ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE
UNIT, CLIMATE CHANGE AND TRADE AGREEMENTS: FRIENDS OR FOES? 18 (2019) (noting a “lack of
clarity about how the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism would treat future trade-related disputes
arising from climate policies”).
105. JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 752 (1969).
106. UN INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE AND LAND
(2019).
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climate instability and international markets.107 The possibility that
developing states would invoke GATT security exceptions in the name of
food security has particularly worried some U.S. agricultural interests,
whose representatives have argued that Trump’s steel tariffs would open the
floodgates to these types of claims.108
It would also be a mistake to think the securitization of climate change
would benefit only left-leaning voices. As Nils Gilman has recently argued,
recognition of anthropogenic climate change could easily go hand-in-hand
with a far right-wing agenda that includes deep restrictions on migration,
hostility to Asian and African development, and the use of military power to
control scarce natural resources.109 The same emergency powers and national
security authorities described above could just as easily be mobilized in the
service of a right-wing program that is newly awakened to the reality of
climate change. For this reason, some commentators have articulated
skepticism about using a national security frame for climate change,
preferring instead frames such as “ecological security,” “human security,” or
no security at all.110 Even so, there are still benefits to employing “essential
security” as a frame for climate measures, insofar as existing trade or
investment rules are perceived as too onerous and in need of disruption.
*
*
*
These dramatic changes raise difficult and unanswered questions about
how best to reconcile shifting demands of national security with the
objectives of trade and investment law.111 As a practical matter, the
expansion of national security into industrial policy (by way of Trump’s
tariffs), e-commerce (by way of controversies over Huawei and personal
data), and climate change (by way of growing emergency rhetoric) put trade
and investment institutions into a difficult position. The legal regime can
choose to “let in” these novel security claims, and thus risk allowing the
107. Molly E. Brown et al., Do Markets and Trade Help or Hurt the Global Food System Adapt to
Climate Change, 68 FOOD POL’Y 154, 156 (2017).
108. David Milligan & Doug Goyings, Eating Away at Our Trade Defenses, THE HILL (Mar. 8,
2018), https://thehill.com/opinion/energy-environment/377463-eating-away-at-our-trade-defenses.
109. Nils Gilman, Beware the Rise of Far-Right Environmentalism, THE WORLD POST (Oct. 17,
2019), https://www.berggruen.org/the-worldpost/articles/beware-the-rise-of-far-rightenvironmentalism/.
110. See e.g., NAOMI KLEIN, THIS CHANGES EVERYTHING 57–58 (2014) (arguing that nationalsecurity and patriotism frames for galvanizing climate action actively reinforce the values that climate
activists should be trying to attack); Maryam Jamshidi, The Climate Crisis Is a Human Security, Not a
National Security, Issue, 93 SO. CAL. L. REV. POSTSCRIPT 36 (2019) (arguing that recourse to national
security undermines democracy and exacerbates disparities created by climate change); McDonald, supra
note 87, at 164–72 (proposing a shift toward an “ecological security” discourse based on the resilience of
interconnected ecosystems).
111. This was the central argument of Heath, supra note 5.
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exception to swallow the rule. Or trade panels and investment tribunals can
draw a boundary, limiting security exceptions to military and militaryadjacent measures, thus risking the regimes’ legitimacy insofar as the
securitization of these issues enjoys wide popular support. This dilemma is
likely to reappear even if judicial review focuses on the proportionality or
rationality of security measures, rather than on the nature of security itself.112
The problem is especially acute because it exacerbates uncertainty
precisely where reforms in trade and investment law are most urgently
needed. Among the most important discussions in trade and investment law
today are reforming trade law to permit a wider range of experimentation in
industrial policy,113 defining the terms of engagement between trade rules
and transnational data flows,114 and ensuring that trade and investment
agreements do not “chill” legitimate environmental and health regulation.115
As these issues become securitized, any settlement that is reached in any new
trade agreement could be disrupted by a novel national security claim. One
does not need to be a free-trade partisan to think that greater clarity here is
important. So long as you accept that some global governance of trade is
inevitable, it is important to consider the terms of engagement between trade
and these other fields and to ask how evolving conceptions of national
security will affect those terms. The following sections will identify these
emerging terms of engagement and discuss the tradeoffs between alternative
112. On the tendency of means-ends proportionality review to collapse into more fundamental
assumptions about the relative importance of public policy objectives, see J.H.H. Weiler, Comment,
Brazil–Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres (DS322), 8 WORLD TRADE REV. 137, 140 (2009).
113. See, e.g., SHERZOD SHADIKODJAEV, INDUSTRIAL POLICY AND THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION 271 (2018) (“The general tendency in setting trade rules has been to squeeze a
government’s sovereignty over trade-related aspects of industrial policy, on the one hand, and to
recognize its autonomy in addressing public interests, on the other. Overall, members have their hands
tied by WTO strictures and may utilize the available policy space only under limited conditions. Such
legal constraints and flexibilities discussed in this book may not necessarily constitute an ideal balance.”);
Alvaro Santos, Carving Out Policy Autonomy for Developing Countries in the World Trade Organization,
52 VA. J. INT’L L. 551 (2012) (arguing that developing states can act strategically to create flexibility in
the WTO regime for industrial policy space); Wu & Salzman, supra note 27, 454–73 (arguing that
domestic trade remedies laws, rather than WTO law, pose the greatest threat to so-called green industrial
policy, and suggesting “narrowly tailored” reforms).
114. Streinz, supra note 62, at 313 (identifying competing models for the regulation of digital trade);
Susan Ariel Aaronson & Patrick Leblond, Another Digital Divide: The Rise of Data Realms and Its
Implications for the WTO, 21 J. INT’L ECON. L. 245 (2018) (arguing that U.S., E.U., and Chinese
regulations have “created three distinct data realms with different approaches to data governance,”
creating a challenge for the WTO); Neha Mishra, Building Bridges: International Trade Law, Internet
Governance, and the Regulation of Data Flows, 52 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 463 (2018) (offering an
account that integrates cybersecurity with the free flow of data).
115. See, e.g., ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE UNIT, supra note 104, at 14–18 (assessing the positive and
negative effects of WTO law on climate policy); Kyla Tienhaara, Regulatory Chill in a Warming World,
7 TRANSNAT’L ENVTL. L. 229 (2017) (arguing that corporations could use investor-state dispute
settlement to forestall action on climate change, and suggesting reforms).
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approaches.
III. STRUCTURED POLITICS AT THE WTO
Today, due to an ongoing crisis at the WTO, the default mode for
addressing novel security matters in the trading system is likely to be one of
political bargaining, rather than adjudication. Since December 2019, the
WTO Appellate Body has lacked the members necessary to staff new cases,
paralyzing the appellate system. The Appellate Body’s collapse sets off a
chain of legal events that allows any party to a WTO dispute to block the
adoption of a panel report.116 This development represents a shift away from
legalism in international trade and instead toward a more power-based
system, signaling what Gregory Shaffer has called “the end of an era—
potentially the close of at least the semblance of the rule of law in
international trade relations.”117 For the time being, this development
concerns a much broader swath of trade than just security matters—a state
need not invoke essential security, or really any particular justification at all,
for blocking a panel report. But there is reason to believe that this powerbased mode of dispute settlement may persist for security measures in
particular, even if the Appellate Body is revived. It is therefore important to
understand the ways in which law will continue to structure these political
interactions, even in the absence of appellate review, in addition to the
particular kinds of flexibility that this new structure affords.
The WTO’s peculiar legal structure has enabled this sudden turn to
politics. For years, the United States has refused to consent to appoint any
new members to the WTO Appellate Body, thus allowing that body’s
membership to dwindle as terms expire.118 As of December 10, 2019, the
Appellate Body’s membership had dwindled to just two members, rendering
the body incapable of establishing a three-member panel necessary to hear
116. See generally Rachel Brewster, Analyzing the Trump Administration’s International Trade
Strategy, 42 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1419, 1425–27 (2019); Chang-fa Lo, Junji Nakagawa & Tsai-fang
Chen, Introduction: Let the Jewel in the Crown Shine Again, in THE APPELLATE BODY, supra note 2, at
3, 4.
117. Shaffer, supra note 2, at 53.
118. See e.g., Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, How Should WTO Members React to Their WTO Crisis?,
18 WORLD TRADE REV. 503, 506–07 (2019). Appointments to the Appellate Body have always been
made by consensus, consistent with the governing law. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes art. 2(4) & n.1, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter WTO DSU], though there is
dispute about whether appointment by majority vote would be permissible. See, e.g., JENNIFER HILLMAN,
THREE APPROACHES TO FIXING THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION’S APPELLATE BODY: THE GOOD,
THE BAD, AND THE UGLY? 11–12 (2019) (arguing that appointment of AB members is an “appointment,”
rather than a decision, and so not subject to the consensus rule, and is required by the requirement that
“vacancies shall be filled as they arise”).
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any new cases.119 This undermines the ability of the Appellate Body to
perform its supervisory and error-correcting functions, but there impact is
even broader than that. Pursuant to the governing agreements, a first-instance
panel report cannot be “adopted” by the membership if an appeal is
pending.120 A party to a trade dispute can thus prevent the adoption of any
panel report by filing an appeal “into the void” left by the Appellate Body,
where it will languish indefinitely until the United States lifts its blockade of
new Appellate Body members.121 If a panel report cannot be adopted, then it
never becomes binding, and neither party can make use of the critical
provisions in WTO law for overseeing compliance with the report and for
managing retaliation.122 The Appellate Body’s collapse, in short, effectively
grants any state the right to unilaterally veto a decision by trade adjudicators.
This shift renders the WTO dispute system comparable to the earlier
GATT regime, though the match is not identical, and the differences matter.
For much of the life of the 1947 GATT, any member could block an
adjudicatory proceeding in either of two ways: it could refuse to consent to
the establishment of a panel, or it could refuse to consent to the adoption of
a panel report.123 This led to some panels never being formed, and to many
reports not being adopted, particularly on controversial issues such as trade
remedies.124 Beginning in 1989, new rules entitled any complaining GATT
member to establish a dispute panel as of right, but the losing party could
still unilaterally block adoption of the report.125 The WTO system today thus
looks more like the post-1989 GATT—any member can establish a panel to
adjudicate any violation of any WTO agreement, but the panel’s resulting
report could be unilaterally blocked by an appeal into the void.
This turns out to be an important qualification. Prior to the 1989 rules
change, a GATT member could unilaterally prevent trade adjudicators from
even addressing a sensitive legal or factual issue. This was evident in the
mid-1980s disputes over the U.S. trade embargo of Nicaragua, where the
United States assented to the establishment of a panel only after narrowly

119. See e.g., Jonathan Josephs, WTO Chief: ‘Months’ Needed to Fix Disputes Body, BBC NEWS
(Dec. 10, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/business-50736344.
120. WTO DSU, supra note 118, art. 16(4) (“If a party has notified its decision to appeal, the report
by the panel shall not be considered for adoption by the DSB until after completion of the appeal.”).
121. Joost Pauwelyn, WTO Dispute Settlement Post 2019: What to Expect, 22 J. INT’L ECON. L. 297,
303–04 (2019).
122. See WTO DSU, supra note 118, art. 21.
123. See e.g., Amelia Porges, The New Dispute Settlement: From the GATT to the WTO, 8 LEIDEN
J. INT’L L. 115, 117 (1995).
124. Pauwelyn, supra note 121, at 306.
125. Improvements to the GATT Dispute Settlement Rules and Procedures, Decision of Apr. 12,
1989, at 3–4, 7, GATT Doc. L/6489 (Apr. 13, 1989).
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tailoring the panel’s terms of reference to avoid any decision on the GATT
security exception.126 For security issues, this meant that it was impossible
to get a third-party legal interpretation of terms like “essential security
interests” or “emergency” within the GATT framework, so long as a
powerful state was in opposition. The legal structure of the WTO, along with
the precedent set by the 2019 Russia—Transit panel report, changes things.
Even today, any state that brings a trade dispute relating to another
government’s security measure is entitled to a panel, and that panel is likely
to make at least some ruling on the applicability of the WTO security
exceptions.127 The difference is that the resulting report stands a good chance
of never being adopted.128
An unadopted panel report, while lacking legal force, can still have
important effects on state behavior. During the GATT period, unadopted
reports were frequently used as the basis for negotiating the resolution of
trade disputes, and there is some reason to think that this practice would
resume.129 More generally, unadopted reports still contain a record of
126. Panel Report, United States—Trade Measures Affecting Nicaragua, ¶¶ 1.2–1.5, 5.3, GATT
Doc. L/6053 (Oct. 13, 1986).
127. In this way, the situation is even more legalized than under the post-1989 GATT, when the
ability to have a third-party adjudicator rule on the security exception was still in doubt. See Minutes of
Meeting Held in the Centre William Rappard on 18 March 1992, 15, GATT Doc. C/M/255 (Apr. 10,
1992) (“The [European] Community recognized that . . . a panel had to be established at the second
Council meeting at which it was requested . . . . Clearly, however, the rules were silent on the question of
whether, in situations where measures taken for non-economic reasons were involved, a different course
could be taken such as, for example, agreeing to establish a panel in principle but delaying its activation
subject to further clarity in the situation. Whatever the course of action taken at the present meeting, the
Community reserved its rights as to what constituted standard terms of reference for a panel which dealt
with measures taken for non-economic reasons.”).
128. Not in all cases, however. The Russia—Transit report, issued in April 2019, was not appealed
by either side and was swiftly adopted, with both Ukraine and Russia claiming a kind of victory. See
Minutes of Meeting Held in the Centre William Rappard on 26 April 2019, 19–20, WTO Doc.
WT/DSB/M/428 (June 25, 2019) (statement of the Russian representative) (welcoming the panel’s
decision that Russia’s measures did not violate its WTO commitments, and, in remarks that may reference
the U.S. steel and aluminum tariffs, stating that the panel’s decision “excluded the possibility of abusing
provisions of Article XXI to justify measures introduced for the purposes of mere economic
protectionism”); id. at 20 (statement of the Ukrainian representative) (endorsing portions of the panel
report that referred to earlier U.N. statements condemning the “temporary occupation” of Ukrainian
territory).
129. Marc Benitah, Does the Present Paralysis of the AB Mean that the WTO Is Dead?: No, and
This Is Why, INT’L ECON. L. & POL’Y BLOG (Dec. 22, 2019), https://ielp.worldtradelaw.net/2019/12/doesthe-present-paralysis-of-the-ab-means-that-a-wto-panel-report-is-now-worthless.html. Notably, in the
first case appealed into the void—United States—Countervailing Measures on Hot Rolled Steel, appealed
by the United States—the parties recently stated that they were working toward a negotiated solution.
Joint Communication from India and the United States, United States—Countervailing Measures on
Certain Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Flat Products from India: Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by India,
WTO Doc. WT/DS436/22 (Jan. 16, 2020); cf. Robert Lighthizer, U.S. Trade Representative, Address to
the Center for Strategic & Int’l Studs.: U.S. Trade Policy Priorities (Sept. 18, 2017) (on file with the Ctr.
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reasoning about trade-law principles, and as such can influence cases before
regional trade fora, in investor-state arbitration, or under commercial treaties
in domestic courts or at the International Court of Justice.
The second major difference between the current state of play and the
GATT years is the WTO’s highly articulated committee structure. The WTO
agreements provide for a structure of specialized counsels and committees,
which do much of the “day to day work of the WTO.”130 These committees
have been described as a “hidden world” of trade governance, which
facilitate shared understandings and regulatory learning, elaborate openended norms, and resolve disputes before they reach adjudication.131
Although most of these issues involve relatively low-salience technocratic
issues, there are isolated instances of high-profile concerns being raised and
resolved in the WTO committees.132 Furthermore, although committee work
is sometimes said to take place “in the shadow” of the dispute settlement
system,133 it is not clear that formal adjudication is necessary for the
committees to do their work. It is just as likely that the threat of retaliation—
whether inside or outside the WTO dispute settlement system—is what
drives norm-elaboration and informal dispute settlement in the committees.
If that is correct, then WTO committee work will remain an important, if
understudied, component of the international trading system even if the
Appellate Body remains inoperable.
The upshot is that this new structure does provide for greater flexibility
and a much more prominent role for power politics, but all still within a legal
framework. A state’s decision to appeal a case “into the void” will be
premised on calculations about reputation, relative power, and reciprocity; it
matters how the decision will be received by trading partners, whether the
state has sufficient economic or political muscle to “go it alone,” and whether

for Strategic & Int’l Studs.) (“[B]efore the WTO, under the GATT, and there was a system where you
would bring panels and then you would have a negotiation. And, you know, trade grew and we resolved
issues eventually. And, you know, it’s a system that, you know, was successful for a long period of
time.”). See generally Robert E. Hudec, The New WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure: An Overview of
the First Three Years, 8 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 3–15 (1999) (discussing the impact of adopted and
unadopted panel reports).
130. MITSUO MATSUSHITA ET AL., THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: LAW, PRACTICE, AND
POLICY 12 (3d ed. 2015).
131. Andrew Lang & Joanne Scott, The Hidden World of WTO Governance, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 575,
577–601 (2009); see also Henrik Horn, Petros C. Mavroidis & Erik N. Wijkstrom, In the Shadow of the
DSU: Addressing Specific Trade Concerns in the WTO SPS and TBT Committees, 47 J. WORLD TRADE
579 (2013) (describing these committees as exercising a form of informal dispute settlement).
132. Andrew Lang & Joanne Scott, The Hidden World of WTO Governance: A Rejoinder to Richard
Steinberg, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1073, 1076 (2009).
133. Id.; Horn, Mavroidis & Wijkstrom, supra note 131, at 579.
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retaliation is likely.134 This means that bigger economies will likely be more
readily able to push the envelope. At the same time, the flexibility created by
the Appellate Body’s collapse provides an opportunity for smaller countries
and emerging economies to likewise re-strike the balance between trade law
and other vital interests. This could include, for example, demanding that
trade law give way to demands of food security or adopting an invigorated
industrial policy with respect to other economic sectors, such as
cyberspace.135 Despite this greater flexibility, the existence of the WTO
committee structure ensures that such measures can at least be addressed and
discussed—though perhaps not resolved—at the WTO,136 and any state has
the right to request a legal opinion from a panel on the consistency of these
novel security interests with WTO law.
As the situation at the WTO continues to evolve, it will be important to
consider how legal reforms affect politics outside of the adjudicatory
process. For instance, one prominent proposal for restoring the Appellate
Body has obliquely suggested that some issues could be diverted from the
dispute settlement system altogether.137 If this involves the “formal
exclusion” of security measures from dispute settlement, then the picture
might look even more like the 1947 GATT era, thus maximizing flexibility
and cementing a return to politics.138 If, by contrast, security measures are
diverted from adjudication and toward an alternative mechanism—such as
resolution before a WTO political body, an expert review, or a mediated
conciliation process—this may preserve a more optimal balance between
flexibility and governance.139 The present moment thus calls for greater
consideration of mechanisms that exist between diplomacy and self-restraint,
on the one hand, and formal adjudication on the other hand.140
The turn toward structured politics at the WTO also raises important
questions about the horizontal and vertical boundaries of the trade regime.
134. Pauwelyn, supra note 121, at 306–08. This is similar to the dynamic that played out under the
GATT security exception. See Roger P. Alford, The Self-Judging WTO Security Exception, 2011 UTAH
L. REV. 697, 755–57 (2011).
135. See supra Part II.
136. For a compelling argument that this function of the WTO could be advanced by the creation
of a committee on trade and security, see Simon Lester & Huan Zhu, A Proposal for “Rebalancing” to
Deal with “National Security” Trade Restrictions, 42 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1451, 1472 (2019).
137. Strengthening and Modernizing the WTO: Discussion Paper, at 3, Communication from
Canada, WTO Doc. JOB/GC/201 (Sept. 24, 2018).
138. See id. (suggesting “possibly even formal exclusion of certain types of disputes or certain issues
from the jurisdiction of adjudication”). For skepticism that return to the political dynamics of the GATT
era is even possible, see Heath, supra note 5, at 1060–63.
139. Robert McDougall, The Crisis in WTO Dispute Settlement: Fixing Birth Defects to Restore
Balance, 52 J. WORLD TRADE 867, 889 (2019).
140. Heath, supra note 5, at 1027.
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Horizontally, the collapse of the WTO’s binding and effective adjudicatory
mechanism—a rarity in international law—potentially undermines trade
law’s claim to de facto superiority over other, less legalized regimes. For
instance, Michael Fakhri has welcomed the collapse of the Appellate Body,
suggesting that it could lead to new institutional designs that better recognize
the polycentrism of so-called “trade” issues: matters such as food security,
access to medicine, and transnational labor.141 Vertically, it is an open
question whether changing conceptions of security will permanently shift
which interests drive domestic trade policy and how national delegations will
represent those interests in the WTO and other institutions.
IV. NATIONAL SECURITY LEGALISM
Even as the WTO adjudicatory system is collapsing, some members of
the trading system are advocating a renewed commitment to what might be
called “national security legalism.” In April 2019, a WTO dispute settlement
panel issued a historic ruling declaring that disputes under the GATT
security exception were justiciable.142 For many, the panel’s analysis
confirmed that the security exception—which expressly delegates significant
discretion to member states and had long been argued to be “selfjudging”143—could be carved up into constituent elements, some of which
were subject to full, objective review by a trade panel.144 The European
Union, in particular, has enthusiastically embraced this ruling and argued for

141. Michael Fakhri, Life Without the WTO - Part I: Stop All this Crisis-Talk, EJIL: TALK! (Apr.
25, 2019), https://www.ejiltalk.org/life-without-the-wto-part-i-stop-all-this-crisis-talk/#more-17114.
142. Panel Report, Russia—Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit, WTO Doc. WT/DS512/R
(adopted Apr. 5, 2019).
143. See, e.g., Alford, supra note 134, at 708 (arguing that a “majority” of states in the GATT years
argued that the invocations of the security exception were not subject to judicial review, including, at
various times, the United States, Canada, the European Communities, the United Kingdom, and
Australia).
144. The GATT security exception reads, in full:
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed
(a) to require any contracting party to furnish any information the disclosure of which it
considers contrary to its essential security interests; or
(b) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action which it considers necessary for the
protection of its essential security interests
(i) relating to fissionable materials or the materials from which they are derived;
(ii) relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of war and to such traffic
in other goods and materials as is carried on directly or indirectly for the purpose of
supplying a military establishment;
(iii) taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations; or
(c) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action in pursuance of its obligations under
the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security.
GATT 1947, supra note 50, art. XXI(b). Similar language can be found in GATS, supra note 77, art. XIV
bis; TRIPS, supra note 77, art. 73.

HEATH(DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

5/16/2020 9:03 AM

TRADE AND SECURITY AMONG THE RUINS

251

its expansion in disputes with the United States over Trump’s steel and
aluminum tariffs. The legalist approach could put a brake on the evolution
of new security interests in a number of different ways. It thus maximizes
governance over security measures, while reducing de jure flexibility, and is
most likely to find root in fora where legalism is a hallmark of authority.
The Russia—Transit panel report of April 2019 was indeed a historic
ruling for the WTO and for trade law generally. The panel, chaired by former
Appellate Body member Georges Abi-Saab, rejected categorically the
proposition that the GATT security exception was self-judging.145 The
panel’s report widens the scope for judicial scrutiny of security measures
through a divide-and-conquer strategy, minimizing the reach of language in
this provision that purports to leave wide discretion in the hands of states.
Some elements of the security exception—such as whether the measure
“relat[es]” to arms traffic or was “taken in time of . . . emergency”—must be
assessed fully and “objectively” by the adjudicator.146 If this objective
criterion is met, then a state may take measures “it considers necessary for
the protection of its essential security interests,” but even this broad
discretion is subject to an overarching obligation of good faith.147 This
approach vindicates much of the literature on the GATT security exception,
wherein authors have argued for carving up the exception in similar ways.148
Among the WTO members that have expressed support for the
Russia—Transit panel’s ruling, the European Union is arguably the most
enthusiastic. In an ongoing dispute with the United States, the European
Union has argued for extending the divide-and-conquer approach even
further, contending that a panel may also objectively assess whether a
particular issue is a “security interest,” whether that interest is “essential,”
and whether a measure is “for the protection of” a security interest.149 These
moves, if accepted, could significantly limit the ability of states to innovate
novel security interests, even under newer treaties that have much broader
security exceptions.150
145. See e.g., Panel Report, Russia—Transit, supra note 142, ¶ 7.102.
146. Id. ¶ 7.101.
147. Id. ¶¶ 7.132, 7.138.
148. See, e.g., Dapo Akande & Sope Williams, International Adjudication on National Security
Issues: What Role for the WTO?, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 365 (2003); Hannes L. Schloemann & Stefan Ohlhoff,
‘Constitutionalization’ and Dispute Settlement in the WTO: National Security as an Issue of Competence,
93 AM. J. INT’L L. 424 (1999).
149. Opening Oral Statement by the European Union, United States—Certain Measures on Steel
and Aluminum Products, ¶¶ 123–129, WTO Case No. DS548 (Nov. 4, 2019) [hereinafter EU Oral
Statement (DS548)] (arguing that “objective elements are to be found in the chapeau of Article XXI(b):
what are the ‘security’ interests, whether such interests are ‘essential’ and whether a measure is adopted
‘for’ the protection of such interests”).
150. For instance, the EU’s arguments that “security interest,” “essential,” and “for the protection
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National security legalism can operate as a check on the growth of novel
security interests in at least two ways. By narrowly reading the security
exceptions in the GATT and other trade treaties, tribunals and panels can
shunt some novel security interests away from the exception altogether or
impose procedural requirements that discourage states from
opportunistically relabeling public-policy matters as security interests.
While these approaches maximize trade governance over security measures,
they rely on certain contestable assumptions about the trade system. It is thus
worth pausing to assess both techniques before noting where security
legalism is likely to take root.
A. Channeling Security
First, a legalist approach can “channel”151 some novel security interests
away from the GATT security exception (or its analogs in other treaties) and
toward provisions that provide for greater oversight over trade-restricting
measures. The EU litigation strategy at the WTO provides particularly strong
examples of this. In response to the U.S. steel and aluminum tariffs, which
were purportedly imposed for national security reasons, Europe has
contended that these tariffs are in fact disguised safeguard measures, and
they are thus subject to the rules and restrictions contained in those
provisions.152 And, in response to the suggestion that environmental or other
public-policy measures could constitute security interests, the EU has
obliquely suggested that the GATT security exception “cannot be used to
circumvent the requirements” of other public-policy exceptions.153 The
suggestion appears to be that public policy measures covered by GATT
of” are also objectively assessable terms not subject to the “it considers” language appears tailor-made
for many newer treaties. See, e.g., CPTPP, supra note 74 (“Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed
to: . . . (b) preclude a Party from applying measures that it considers necessary for . . . the protection of
its own essential security interests.”). The CPTPP formulation, which lacks the objective criteria of GATT
Article XXI(b)(i)–(iii), is increasingly common in investment agreements and regional trade treaties.
Karl P. Sauvant & Mevelyn Ong et al., The Rise of Self-Judging Essential Security Interest Clauses in
International Investment Agreements, (Columbia FDI Perspectives No. 188, 2016).
151. I am indebted to Tim Meyer for the term “channeling,” and I think my usage here bears at least
a family resemblance to his. See Tim Meyer, Univ. of Cambridge, Lauterpacht Centre for International
Law Friday Lecture: Foreign Affairs and the National Security Economy (Apr. 26, 2019) (recording on
file with the Lauterpacht Centre for Int’l L.).
152. Chad P. Bown, Europe Is Pushing Back Against Trump’s Steel and Aluminum Tariffs: Here’s
How,
WASH.
POST:
MONKEY
CAGE
(Mar.
9,
2018,
5:00
AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/03/09/europe-is-pushing-back-againsttrumps-steel-and-aluminum-tariffs-heres-how/. The EU has also argued that it is thus entitled to retaliate
against the U.S. measures without waiting for a WTO ruling, as provided for in the special rules for
safeguards.
153. European Union Third Party Oral Statement, Russia—Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit,
¶ 27, WTO Doc. DS512 (Jan. 25, 2018).
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Article XX—which allows for measures “necessary” for human or
environmental health, public morals, etc., so long as they are not arbitrarily
discriminatory—cannot be re-characterized as security measures to take
advantage of the broader discretion afforded by GATT Article XXI.
Underlying both arguments is the idea of a division of labor in trade
agreements, where different exceptions are calibrated to respond to different
political-economic pressures on liberalized trade.
This vision of trade agreements is calibrated to maximize the ability of
tribunals to review novel security measures, while allowing more traditional
measures to continue to make use of the security exceptions. Many emerging
security interests—such as those discussed in Part II above—emerge from
domestic political-economy problems that are addressed by other trade rules,
and that do not resemble the problems that accompany traditional security
concerns. The GATT security exception was invoked most often in the
context of war or other interstate rivalries, where one GATT member simply
could not be expected to carry on normal trade relations with another.154 As
Tim Meyer notes, in this context the self-judging security exception
performed a “loss-avoidance” function for the trade regime—it prevented
the rules from requiring that states engage in normal trade relations when it
was clear that they would not comply.155 This made particular sense for
broader geopolitical conflicts, whose causes were often not directly tied to
trade.
The emerging security interests discussed above, and the policies and
political coalitions they imply, are quite different. For example, a securitized
industrial policy will be backed by a coalition of those seeking protection for
domestic industry—whether steel, semiconductors, or renewable energy—
along with those who believe that industry connects with their government’s
vital interests and seek to advance that interest internationally.156 Arguably,

154. See, e.g., Reply by the Vice-Chairman of the United States Delegation, 9, GATT Doc.
GATT/CP.3/38 (June 2, 1949) (U.S. export controls on trade with Eastern Bloc countries after World
War II); Meeting Held in the Centre William Rappard on 29 May 1985, GATT Doc. C/M/188, at 2–17
(June 28, 1985) (U.S.-Nicaragua embargo); Minutes of Meeting Held in the Centre William Rappard on
16 October 1996, 7, WTO Doc. WT/DSB/M/24 (Nov. 26, 1996) (U.S.-Cuba embargo); Minutes of
Meeting Held in the Centre William Rappard, 10, GATT Doc. C/M/157 (May 7, 1982) (sanctions on
Argentina); GATT Council, Summary Record of the 12th Session, Dec. 9, 1961, at 196, GATT Doc.
SR.19/12 (Dec. 21, 1961) (Ghana-Portugal trade); Minutes of Meeting Held in the Centre William
Rappard on 7 April 2000, at 12–15, WTO Doc. WT/DSB/M/78 (May 12, 2000) (Nicaragua-Colombia
boundary dispute); Minutes of Meeting Held in the Centre William Rappard on 22 November 2017,
United Arab Emirates—Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services, and Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights, ¶¶ 3.1-3.15, WTO Doc. WT/DSB/M/404 (Mar. 6, 2018) (UAE-Qatar
dispute).
155. Meyer, supra note 151.
156. See id.
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these kinds of security-protectionist coalitions are more aptly addressed by
the WTO’s “safeguards” provisions, which allow states to take “emergency
action” to prevent “serious injury” to domestic industries as the result of
imports, but only within certain procedural and substantive limits.157
Similarly, trade-restrictive or trade-distorting climate regulations might be
advanced by a coalition of environmentalists and domestic industries who
stand to gain from the resulting protection. GATT Article XX, similar to
domestic administrative law, imposes basic procedural and substantive
requirements to ensure that such regulations are, among other things, not a
“disguised restriction on international trade.”158
On this view, re-characterizing industrial policy or climate measures as
security interests could have the effect of upsetting a calibrated balance and
empowering protectionist coalitions domestically. Therefore, it is arguably
appropriate to channel these novel security measures away from security
exceptions and toward more restrictive provisions that better respond to the
political economies that generate the offending measure in the first place.
The trouble with this channeling approach is that its viability depends
on a shared view that trade and investment agreements actually produce this
calculated balance. Insofar as states begin to invoke security exceptions for
industrial policy, climate regulation, or cybersecurity, it may be precisely
because they do not view the other provisions as sufficiently flexible. For
example, there is substantial doubt that the WTO safeguards provisions, as
interpreted by the Appellate Body, are even capable of performing their
intended function of protecting declining industries subject to import
shocks.159 And others have suggested that the economic dislocations from
trade may require broader reforms to trade agreements, such as social
dumping provisions, economic development chapters, and flexibility for
green industrial policy.160 As for regulations concerning cybersecurity or

157. See generally ALAN O. SYKES, THE WTO AGREEMENT ON SAFEGUARDS: A COMMENTARY 59–
72 (2006) (offering an explanation of safeguards grounded in public-choice theory, whereby officials are
able to take back trade concessions when they become too politically costly, particularly as the result of
pressure from declining industries).
158. GATT 1947, supra note 50, art. XX; see also Howse, supra note 103, at 52–53 (arguing that
the WTO practice of conducting “strict scrutiny” of regulations for arbitrariness and discrimination
actually has the effect in some cases of strengthening regulations by forcing states to remove idiosyncratic
exceptions and make the regulatory regime “tighter or stricter”).
159. See, e.g., Alan O. Sykes, The Persistent Puzzles of Safeguards: Lessons from the Steel Dispute,
7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 523, 523 (2004) (“WTO rules . . . pose nearly insurmountable hurdles to the legal use
of safeguard measures by WTO members.”); Alan O. Sykes, The Safeguards Mess: A Critique of WTO
Jurisprudence, 2 WORLD TRADE REV. 261, 261 (2003) (“[N]ations cannot use safeguards without facing
a near certainty that they will be found invalid.”).
160. See e.g., Timothy Meyer, Saving the Political Consensus in Favor of Free Trade, 70 VAND. L.
REV. 985, 986 (2017); Meyer, supra note 55, at 2012–14 (positing that international trade law should be
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climate change, there is already considerable anxiety that the existing nonsecurity exceptions are not sufficiently flexible to allow for legitimate
policymaking.161 More generally, the channeling approach sits uneasily with
the view, articulated by at least one investment tribunal, that allowing for
non-military security interests may be the price that capital-exporting nations
like the United States must pay in exchange for retaining a free hand to
impose embargoes, sanctions, and export controls.162 It is therefore unclear
whether the channeling approach to security exceptions is politically
feasible, even if it does turn out to be a legally available option.163
B. Normalizing Security
In addition to channeling some issues away from security exceptions,
national security legalism can help normalize such issues by imposing
general procedural and substantive requirements that make the security
exception a less attractive option. This can be accomplished by interpreting
certain terms to require administrative rationality, non-arbitrariness, or
proportionality, or by using general principles of good faith to impose broad
procedural requirements.164 All of these techniques go some way toward deexceptionalizing national security measures by rendering them subject to the
same scrutiny that is given to ordinary administrative action under other
treaty provisions. The approach is thus likely to be favored by jurisdictions
reformed to allow for renewable energy policies enacted at the local level); Shaffer, supra note 27, at 33–
39.
161. See supra notes 78 & 104 and accompanying text.
162. Continental Casualty Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award, ¶ 181
(Sept. 5, 2008) (“It may well be that in drafting the model text for Art. XI [of the U.S.-Argentina BIT],
the U.S. intended to protect first of all its own security interests in the light of geopolitical, strategic and
defense concerns, typical of a world power, so as to be able to reserve the right to freeze assets of
foreigners in the U.S. and to resort to unilateral economic sanctions that may conflict with its BIT
obligations. This intention would not exclude from the protection provided by Art. XI different measures
taken by the other Contracting Party in relation to emergency situations affecting essential security
interests of a different nature of such other Contracting Party. These interests such as ‘ensuring internal
security in the face of a severe economic crisis with social, political and public order implications’ may
well raise for such a party, notably for a developing country like Argentina, issues of public order and
essential security interest objectively capable of being covered under Art. XI. An interpretation of a
bilateral reciprocal treaty that accommodates the different interests and concerns of the parties in
conformity with its terms accords with an effective interpretation of the treaty.”).
163. The legality of this approach is also unclear. For skepticism about the E.U.’s treatment of U.S.
steel tariffs as safeguards rather than punitive security measures, see Joseph Weiler, Black Lies, White
Lies, and Some Uncomfortable Truths in and of the International Trading System, EJIL TALK (July 25,
2018),
https://www.ejiltalk.org/black-lies-white-lies-and-some-uncomfortable-truths-in-and-of-theinternational-trading-system/; Simon Lester & Huan Zhu, A Proposal for “Rebalancing” to Deal with
“National Security” Trade Restrictions, 42 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1451, 1465–66 (2019). For a skeptical
note on the argument that measures covered by Article XX cannot be covered by Article XXI, see Heath,
supra note 5, at 1073–74, 1073n.251.
164. For a somewhat critical assessment, see Heath, supra note 7, at 1070–80.
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whose governments are already to some extent bound by such restrictions,
even though it remains in tension with the structure of the GATT and with
trends in drafting more recent trade and investment treaties.
The normalization of national security finds support in academic
writing, the dicta of some investment treaty cases, and in the pleadings of
some WTO members. It is often argued, for example, that states’ general
obligation to perform treaties in good faith implies a requirement that the
measure at issue be proportionate to the purported security interest at
stake.165 This approach would narrow the distance significantly between
self-judging security provisions like GATT Article XXI and other general
exceptions for public-policy measures, which have long been interpreted to
require proportionality.166 Indeed, one panel of arbitrators seems to have
voiced support for convergence.167 The filings of some WTO member states
in disputes over the U.S. steel and aluminum tariffs would also provide a
toehold for stricter proportionality analysis, by, for example, requiring a
relatively robust analysis of whether the measures at issue are “for the
protection of” security interests.168
The effect of these interpretations is to make it less attractive to
reclassify climate measures or industrial policy as “security” issues. The
security exception, as historically understood, appears to allow a wide range
of discretion for measures that are considered to be for “essential security
interests,” as opposed to the more narrowly tailored discretion afforded to
measures relating to health, conservation, or public morals.169 This discretion
becomes particularly attractive to states as the obligations in trade and
investment treaties are interpreted and applied more broadly to capture a
range of trade-affecting regulatory activity, not just tariffs and other border
barriers.170 If security measures are subject to roughly the same scrutiny as

165. See e.g., Stephan W. Schill & Robyn Briese, “If the State Considers”: Self-Judging Clauses in
International Dispute Settlement, 13 MAX PLANCK Y.B.U.N.L. 61, 123–24 (2009) (surveying
arguments).
166. For an adoption of WTO-style proportionality in the context of a non-self-judging security
exception (i.e., one lacking the “it considers” language), see Continental Casualty, Case No. ARB/03/9
at ¶¶ 194–95.
167. LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability,
¶ 214 (Oct. 3, 2006) (“Were the Tribunal to conclude that the provision is self-judging, Argentina’s
determination would be subject to a good faith review anyway, which does not significantly differ from
the substantive analysis presented here.”).
168. See, e.g., EU Oral Statement (DS548), supra note 149, ¶ 129; Norway’s Opening Statement at
the First Substantive Meeting of the Panel with the Parties, United States—Certain Measures on Steel
and Aluminum Products, ¶¶ 66–67, WTO Doc. WT/DS552 (Nov. 6, 2019).
169. For a statement of the self-judging position, see Alford, supra note 134, at 703–04 (presenting
various interpretation of the security exception under Article XXI).
170. Heath, supra note 7, at 1440.
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everything else, this lessens the incentive to invoke security exceptions
internationally, even if doing so is still relevant under domestic law.
Despite the landmark ruling on the security exception in the Russia—
Transit case, it remains unclear whether WTO panels will adopt a strong
form of national security legalism. The Russia—Transit panel itself was
particularly cautious in this respect. For instance, the panel avoided any
suggestion that the state invoking the security exception bears the burdens of
production and persuasion.171 This stands in stark contrast to longestablished WTO jurisprudence on other public-policy exceptions, where the
burden lies initially with the state invoking the exception, and makes it more
difficult to reject a security defense for mere failure to satisfy an element of
the exception. The panel also avoided addressing directly the question
whether the “it considers” language—which gives the exception its
putatively self-judging character—applies only to a measure’s necessity, or
whether it also applies to the requirement that a measure be “for the
protection of [a member’s] essential security interests.”172 If future panels
decide that the “protection” language is not self-judging, this could open up
space to significantly narrow the distance between the security exception and
other public-policy provisions.
It thus remains unclear whether future decision-makers will continue to
further legalize the WTO security exception. There are reasons to be cautious
about doing so. It is unclear how much slicing and dicing the text of the
security exception can really bear, and tribunals may not be willing to impose
a wide range of substantive and procedural obligations on the basis of good
faith alone.173 And states’ continued practice of separating security from
other exceptions, suggest that at least some states do not want to see a
convergence of substantive or procedural standards.174 When states have
sought to subject security measures to judicial scrutiny, such as in human
rights treaties,175 investment treaties,176 and E.U. law,177 they have
171. See, e.g., Russia—Transit Panel Report, supra note 142, ¶¶ 7.113–7.126.
172. See id. ¶¶ 7.63, 7.128 (raising these two possibilities).
173. Heath, supra note 5, at 1075.
174. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
175. See, e.g., Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 15(1),
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (“In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the
nation any High Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its obligations under this
Convention to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures
are not inconsistent with its other obligations under international law.”).
176. Free Trade Agreement, China-Peru, art. 141, Apr. 28, 2009, CHINA FTA NETWORK (“For
greater certainty, if a Party invokes Article 141 (Essential Security) in an arbitral proceeding initiated
under this Chapter, the corresponding tribunal hearing the matter shall find whether the exception
applies.”).
177. Treaty on European Union art. 346, Feb. 7, 1992, 1757 U.N.T.S. 3 (“[A]ny Member State may
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demonstrated their ability to do so. Against this background, the deliberate
choice to employ the self-judging language of the GATT suggests that there
is some limit to national security legalism, at which point politics must take
over.178
C. The Place of National Security Legalism in a Fragmenting System
The shifting institutional landscape of international trade renders the
place of legalism uncertain. Whereas the decision by the Russia—Transit
panel in April 2019 was hailed as a bold statement about the power and
autonomy of the trade judiciary,179 the collapse of the Appellate Body just a
few months later changes the picture. For instance, even if a WTO panel
were to find against the United States in the pending disputes over Trump’s
steel and aluminum tariffs, the United States would likely appeal this
decision “into the void,” rendering the panel report legally ineffective.180
But, at the same time, the proliferation of investment treaties and regional
trade agreements ensures that there remain any number of fora where trade
panelists and arbitrators might be asked to address the intersection of trade
and security. In this fragmented institutional environment, national security
legalism is most likely to thrive wherever acceptance by other legal
professionals, rather than by member states, plays a significant role in an
institution’s claim to authority.
The collapse of the WTO Appellate Body has shifted authority
dynamics in the trading system, potentially permanently. Whereas the
Appellate Body once exercised what Geraldo Vidigal calls “hegemonic
authority” in the trading system, the transmission of legal ideas in trade now
depends on “network authority,” where diplomats and adjudicators across
fora rely and build on each other’s interpretations.181 The paradigm case of

take such measures as it considers necessary for the protection of the essential interests of its security
which are connected with the production of or trade in arms, munitions and war material; such measures
shall not adversely affect the conditions of competition in the internal market regarding products which
are not intended for specifically military purposes.”); id. art. 348 (“[T]he Commission or any Member
State may bring the matter directly before the Court of Justice if it considers that another Member State
is making improper use of the powers provided for in Articles 346 and 347.”).
178. Cf. Akande & Williams, supra note 148, at 386–89 (discussing the limited scope for review
under the “necessity” prong of the Article XXI analysis).
179. See Cho, supra note 1 (referring to the decisions as a “constitutional moment” for the WTO).
180. A ruling in the steel tariffs cases is not expected before “autumn 2020.” Communication from
the Panel, United States—Certain Measures on Steel and Aluminum Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS556/17
(Sept. 10, 2019).
181. Geraldo Vidigal, Living Without the Appellate Body: Hegemonic, Fragmented, and Network
Authority in International Trade 30, Amsterdam L. Sch. Lgl. Studs. Res. Paper No. 2019-15 (Mar. 4,
2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Amsterdam Center for International Law),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3343327.
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network authority is the current system of investor-state arbitration, where
panelists sitting ad hoc for individual cases nonetheless tend to rely on, or at
least engage with, each other’s interpretations of treaty provisions.182 Where
the audience includes other adjudicators in parallel fora, there may be some
benefit in formalistic approaches to the security exception, given that
formalism taps into “the per se compliance pull of a dialogue conducted
between courts in legalese.”183 In this context, the divide-and-conquer
strategy of national security legalism may be particularly attractive.
The broader network of international trade and investment law thus
provides plenty of opportunities for national security legalism to circulate.
As Vidigal notes, the interpretations of WTO panels could be readily adopted
by panelists in disputes under other regional trade treaties, who belong to the
same interpretive community and are in some cases even obligated to
consider prior WTO rulings.184 Investment arbitration panels, too, are likely
to be receptive to legalistic approaches. For instance, in assessing the impact
of the Russia—Transit decision on investment law, José Alvarez suggests
that aspects of the panel report that addressed WTO-specific legitimacy
concerns are unlikely to have a decisive impact on investor-state decisions.185
By the same token, the panel’s decision not to give decisive effect to the “it
considers” language, and to give full effect to other components of the
security exception, is likely to prove influential in trade and investment cases
under similarly worded provisions.186
The recent efforts to salvage the appellate function at the WTO may
also provide a foothold for national security legalism. In early 2020, the
European Union announced that it had reached agreement with sixteen WTO
members, including China and Brazil, to develop an interim arrangement
whereby any panel report could be appealed to a panel of arbitrators.187 The
interim arrangement appears designed to replicate as far as possible the work
of the Appellate Body, including by creating a standing “pool” of ten
appellate arbitrators.188 The pool is to be composed of experts in international
law and trade, and the arrangement appears to express a preference for
182. Id. at 28.
183. J.H.H. Weiler, A Quiet Revolution: The European Court of Justice and Its Interlocutors, 26
COMP. POL. STUDS. 510, 520–21 (1994).
184. Vidigal, supra note 181, at 26–29.
185. See José E. Alvarez, Epilogue: ‘Convergence’ Is a Many-Splendored Thing 30 (July 2019)
(unpublished manuscript) (forthcoming June 2020) (on file with the University of Copenhagen).
186. See id. (manuscript at 23–25).
187. Statements by Ministers, Davos, Switz., Jan. 24, 2020, https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/
2020/january/tradoc_158596.pdf.
188. Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement, Council of the E.U. Doc. 7112/20 (Apr.
20, 2020) [hereinafter Multi-Party IAAA].
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current and former Appellate Body members by exempting them from a preselection vetting process.189 The pool members are also expected to “stay
abreast” of WTO dispute settlement and to discuss among themselves
matters of interpretation and procedure, reflecting a general desire to ensure
consistency in the trade system.190 Despite these efforts to mimic a standing
Appellate Body, the interim arrangement is not envisioned as a permanent
body, nor does it cover all WTO members. Its authority over time will thus
depend on reports being accepted by future panels or in other trade and
investment fora. The language of legalism, in this case, may provide a useful
vehicle for building its network authority.
The arbitration solution, however, also points to the fragility of this
consensus. The multi-member arrangement announced in January brings
together the European Union, which has been national security legalism’s
most forward-leaning proponent, with states that take significantly divergent
views on the appropriate scope of review under the GATT security
exception. For instance, Canada and Australia have both supported judicial
review of security measures, but with a much lighter touch than what Europe
has argued for.191 China’s position is particularly nuanced and delicate,
owing to its dual position as both a frequent user and target of security
measures.192 As a result, China has argued that security measures are
justiciable at the WTO, but that panels must “exercise extreme caution . . .
in order to maintain the delicate balance” between preventing abuse and
maintaining “a Member’s ‘sole discretion’ regarding its own security
interests.”193 This suggests that there may be only limited support for a highly
legalistic interpretation of the security exception, at least from some key
members. It also portends that the coalition in favor of an arbitration solution
may be relatively fragile and that at least some members may demand more
political sensitivity than the arbitration solution—with its ad hoc structure—
is capable of delivering.
National security legalism thus presents its own set of tradeoffs and
risks. This approach maximizes third-party governance over security
measures, giving tribunals a range of tools to oversee and guard against
abusive, pretextual, or overbroad restrictions on trade in the name of national
189. Id. at ¶ 4, ann. 2.
190. Id. at ¶ 5, prmbl.
191. See, e.g., Panel Report, Russia—Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit, ¶¶ 7.36, 7.40, WTO
Doc. WT/DS512/R (adopted Apr. 5, 2019). I am indebted to Harlan Cohen for focusing me on whether
and to what extent there is a shared commitment to legalism around national security issues,
192. See generally Congyan Cai, Enforcing a New National Security?: China’s National Security
Law and International Law, 10 J. E. ASIA & INT’L L. 65 (2017).
193. Panel Report, Russia—Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit, ¶ 7.41, WTO Doc.
WT/DS512/R (adopted Apr. 5, 2019).
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security. With respect to novel and emerging security interests, the strictest
versions of national security legalism discourage efforts by states to re-label
public policy measures, however important, as security interests. But, in a
moment when conceptions about security and its relation to trade are
evolving rapidly, some degree of re-labeling may be warranted. If a design
solution can be found that permits states to redefine their security interests
and restrike the balance between those interests and trade liberalization, this
may be preferable to delegating those sensitive and fundamental questions
to international adjudicators.194
V. JUDICIAL MANAGERIALISM IN SECURITY DISPUTES
In the wake of the Russia—Transit dispute, we can find a third model
of trade-security governance emerging in the space between politics and
adjudication. Indeed, the Russia—Transit panel report itself embeds a vision
of the WTO dispute settlement system as a politically sensitive and flexible
manager of security disputes.195 On this view, trade adjudicators can closely
scrutinize novel and emerging security interests, but can vary their level of
scrutiny in ways that potentially facilitate information-sharing, negotiated
solutions, and institutional innovation. This approach responds to the
concerns of some WTO skeptics that the system of adjudication is
insufficiently flexible to deal with sensitive political disputes.196 But it also
depends on a strong and centralized judicial body that is capable of crafting
justiciability doctrines and adjusting their implementation over time.
Generally speaking, international courts and tribunals are reluctant to
openly embrace what U.S. lawyers call the “passive virtues”—doctrines
enabling courts to decide “whether, when, and how much to adjudicate.”197
To take a particularly salient example, international courts in the post-war
era have generally refused to explicitly endorse anything like the “political
question” doctrine in U.S. law.198 This should not be surprising in a system
194. For an extended version of this argument, see Heath, supra note 5, at 1063–80.
195. I have referred to this model elsewhere as a conception of “stewardship.” See J. Benton Heath,
Trade, Security, and Stewardship (Part IV): A Variable Framework for Security Governance, INT’L
ECON. L. & POL’Y BLOG (May 8, 2019, 6:09 PM), https://ielp.worldtradelaw.net/2019/05/guest-posttrade-security-and-stewardship-part-iv-a-variable-framework-for-security-governance.html.
196. ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH
INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 220–21 (1995).
197. Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court 1960 Term—Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75
HARV. L. REV. 40, 79 (1961); see also Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of
Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 316 (1997) (arguing that the European Court
of Human Rights was only then “discovering the ‘passive virtues’”).
198. See, e.g., Panel Report, Russia—Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit, ¶ 7.103, n.183, WTO
Doc. WT/DS512/R (adopted Apr. 5, 2019) (rejecting the “political question” argument); Certain
Expenses of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1962 I.C.J. 151, 155 (July 20, 1962) (“It has been
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of adjudication founded entirely on the ex ante consent of the parties, since
any court-created justiciability doctrine could be viewed as a perverse
arrogation of judicial power and a refusal to hear disputes properly before
the court.199 Nevertheless, the absence of political question and similar
doctrines was a source of anxiety for some observers of the early WTO
system, who worried that the convergence of trade and non-trade values in
concrete disputes would delegitimize the trading system.200 Although the
turn to proportionality analysis and principles of deference for host-state
policymaking may have mitigated these concerns in subsequent years,201 the
turn to adjudicating trade-and-security disputes provides an occasion to
revisit the passive virtues at the WTO.202
In fact, the Russia—Transit panel itself provides a vision for a more
politically astute and flexible approach to security matters. In a passage that
has not garnered too much attention, the panel states:
7.134. It is . . . incumbent on the invoking Member to articulate the
essential security interests said to arise from the emergency in
international relations sufficiently enough to demonstrate their veracity.
7.135. What qualifies as a sufficient level of articulation will depend on
the emergency in international relations at issue. In particular, the Panel
considers that the less characteristic is the “emergency in international
relations” invoked by the Member, i.e. the further it is removed from
armed conflict, or a situation of breakdown of law and public order
(whether in the invoking Member or in its immediate surroundings), the
less obvious are the defence or military interests, or maintenance of law
and public order interests, that can be generally expected to arise. In such
cases, a Member would need to articulate its essential security interests
with greater specificity than would be required when the emergency in

argued that the question put to the Court is intertwined with political questions, and that for this reason
the Court should refuse to give an opinion . . . . The Court, however, cannot attribute a political character
to a request which invites it to undertake an essentially judicial task, namely, the interpretation of a treaty
provision.”); Jed Odermatt, Patterns of Avoidance: Political Questions Before International Courts, 14
INT’L J. L. CONTEXT 221 (2018) (arguing that international courts “are rarely upfront about this, and are
reluctant to refrain from adjudicating because the dispute involves political, rather than legal, questions.
Rather, [international court]s tend to avoid disputes in a more subtle fashion,” relying on procedural rules,
deference doctrines, or other techniques). See generally HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW
IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY (1933) (providing an extensive and influential critique of the view,
then widely held, that certain international disputes are non-justiciable because of their political
character).
199. Cf. Bickel, supra note 197, at 47 (noting that a court’s decision to “decline the exercise of
jurisdiction which [validly] given” is in tension with a “strict-constructionist” view of judicial power).
200. See, in particular Jeffrey L. Dunoff, The Death of the Trade Regime, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 733,
754–57 (1999).
201. See Howse, supra note 103, at 45–53.
202. Cf. Dunoff, supra note 200, at 757–60 (arguing that Bickel’s arguments for the passive virtues
are “extremely suggestive” for the WTO in “trade-and” disputes).
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international relations involved, for example, armed conflict.203

This passage suggests a flexible approach to security that is particularly
designed to address novel security threats. It imposes a baseline procedural
obligation on any state invoking the security exception to “articulate” the
security interests at stake.204 At the same time, the panel appears to explicitly
contemplate that security interests may shift and evolve over time.205 Novel
or unusual security interests thus demand a higher level of articulation from
states. This variable level of scrutiny is presented as a justifiable response to
the “channeling” problem identified above206—the concern that a state will
“re-label” its policies as security interests in order to escape the constraints
of trade agreements.207 Nevertheless, if a state can sufficiently articulate
about the security interests at stake, then potentially any interest can pass
muster under the exception, provided that its other elements are met.
It should be noted that this passage may have been included in the report
less as a forward-looking vision of trade governance, and more as a response
to the particular problems of this case. As I have noted elsewhere, Russia
was remarkably vague throughout this dispute about the exact emergency
and security interests at stake, and Ukraine understandably did nothing to
clarify matters.208 The panel—which seemed to be at pains to apply Article
XXI to the facts at hand and to avoid resolving the case on burden-of-proof
grounds—thus needed to devise a basis for excusing Russia for the near
absence of any articulation of the security interests at stake. The variable test
in the passage noted above provides that basis, allowing the panel to find
that, because the emergency at issue “is very close to the ‘hard core’ of war
or armed conflict,” Russia’s mysterious litigation strategy was nonetheless
sufficient to trigger the security exception.209 This approach also provides a
legal basis for holding the United States to a higher procedural obligation in

203. Panel Report, Russia—Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit, ¶¶ 7.134–7.135, WTO Doc.
WT/DS512/R (adopted Apr. 5, 2019).
204. This obligation is derived from the principle that all treaties must be performed and interpreted
in good faith. Id. ¶ 7.133. It is consistent with the obligation in GATS art. XIV bis, supra note 77, to
notify the WTO of security measures to the extent practicable. But neither the GATT nor most security
exceptions explicitly require any prior notice or articulation.
205. Panel Report, Russia—Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit, ¶ 7.131, WTO Doc.
WT/DS512/R (adopted Apr. 5, 2019).
206. See supra Part III.A.
207. Panel Report, Russia—Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit, ¶ 7.133, WTO Doc.
WT/DS512/R (adopted Apr. 5, 2019).
208. J. Benton Heath, Trade, Security, and Stewardship (Part III): WTO Panels as Factfinders under
Article XXI, INT’L ECON. L. & POL’Y BLOG (May 7, 2019 1:36 PM), https://ielp.worldtradelaw.net/2019/
05/guest-post-trade-security-and-stewardship-part-iii-wto-panels-as-factfinders-under-article-xxi.html.
209. Panel Report, Russia—Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit, ¶ 7.136, WTO Doc.
WT/DS512/R (adopted Apr. 5, 2019).
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later cases, which appeared to be another goal of the panel.210
That said, the panel’s decision suggests a promising way forward for
addressing novel security threats without prejudging them. Consider two
examples of the security threats discussed above: industrial policy and
cybersecurity. First, take a hypothetical domestic statute that permits
increasing tariffs on imported products, but only after close scrutiny of the
effects of those products on national security and a decision by the executive
that contains a clear articulation of the security threat and its relationship to
the tariffs adopted.211 If tariffs adopted pursuant to this statute are later
challenged before a trade panel, the panel could defer to the security
rationales articulated in the domestic regulatory process without substituting
its own judgment. The obligation to articulate thus provides the panel with
an assurance that rule-of-law values are being promoted elsewhere, even if
the particular requirements of trade rules are not being followed.
Second, consider cybersecurity measures that affect trade, such as
restrictions on cross-border data transfers.212 As noted above, it remains
unclear how trade and investment rules will or should respond to the
regulation of cyberspace, and particularly to cybersecurity measures.213 In
recognition of this issue, some recent trade agreements have included broad
obligations to engage and cooperate internationally on cybersecurity
matters.214 It is possible that, where a state can show that a particular type of
security measure is subject to ongoing negotiation or deliberation in some
trade or non-trade forum that addresses cybersecurity, a panel could apply
the “sufficient level of articulation” test to defer to those ongoing
negotiations. In this way, a state could avoid scrutiny of cybersecurity
measures by showing not that the measures are already regulated by other
rules or standards, but that the state is engaging in good-faith negotiation
with its treaty partners to develop new standards.215
In each example, this approach to security governance relies on a
210. The United States figures prominently in the Russia—Transit panel decision, and many
passages appear to be directed at the U.S. steel tariffs specifically. E.g., Todd Tucker, The WTO Just
Blew Up Trump’s Argument for Steel Tariffs, WASH. POST (Apr. 5, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/04/05/wto-just-blew-up-trumps-argument-steel-tariffs/
(“[N]umerous parts of the decision seemed to constitute warning shots across Trump’s bow.”).
211. This is a more constrained version of the existing statute in the United States, which in reality
provides authority for imposing tariffs on security grounds with an open-ended definition of security and
minimal process. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
212. This example is drawn from Heath, supra note 5, at 1094.
213. See supra Part II.B.
214. E.g., USMCA, supra note 79, art. 19.15.
215. Cf. Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
Products: Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia, ¶¶ 111-34, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/RW
(adopted Oct. 22, 2001).
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broadly managerial form of “enforced self-regulation”216 that may offer
significant benefits over the more legalistic approaches discussed above.
Most obviously, the approach envisioned here can remain open to the
emergence of new security interests, without opening a loophole so wide that
any public-policy measure could pass through. It also forces states to provide
information on the kind of security interests that they consider capable of
overriding trade agreements, without worrying about approaches that
essentialize the notion of national security and declare some interests to be
out of bounds a priori. This can enable mutual learning among both states
and adjudicators. From the perspective of the adjudicator, this approach
enables some flexibility to allow international negotiations and regulatory
innovation to proceed, thus connecting with broader demands for a restored
“institutional balance” in the trading system.217 And this approach, based in
the principle of good faith, could also perform the same “channeling”
function as more legalistic approaches by actively policing for disguised
restraints on trade.218
That said, the managerialist approach to security governance is not a
panacea for the trading system. First, the legal basis for this approach is open
to question. Although the test articulated by the Russia—Transit panel
purports to be based in the universally recognized principle of good faith,
that principle is, as I have noted elsewhere, a “tenuous legal hook for . . . an
expansive lawmaking enterprise.”219 Even if this approach can be legally
justified, the judicial discretion it implies is in tension with the idea of a
consent-based dispute settlement system with a mandate to adjudicate legal
disputes that are validly submitted to it. A managerial approach like this also
raises distributional concerns because it tends to privilege wealthy countries
that are more readily able to convince adjudicators that they have the
capacity to regulate themselves through domestic procedures.
At present, the managerialist approach also appears to lack a suitable
institutional home. As Julian Arato has discussed in his study of decisions
transplanting the “margin of appreciation” from European human rights law
to investment arbitration, ad hoc systems of dispute settlement are ill-suited
to apply managerial forms of deference.220 The flexible approach envisioned
216. See generally IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION 102–09 (1992).
217. See, e.g., McDougall, supra note 139.
218. J. Benton Heath, Trade, Security and Stewardship (Part V): Implications for International
Economic Law, INT’L ECON. L. & POL’Y BLOG (May 9, 2019, 7:08 PM), https://ielp.worldtradelaw.net/
2019/05/guest-post-trade-security-and-stewardship-part-v-implications-for-international-economiclaw.html.
219. Heath, supra note 5, at 1075.
220. Julian Arato, The Margin of Appreciation in International Investment Law, 54 VA. J. INT’L L.
545, 571 (2014).
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here, like the margin of appreciation, depends on consistent management
over time, and is thus best-suited to a standing judicial body with relatively
consistent membership.221 The Russia—Transit panel may have envisioned
that its approach could take root in a revived Appellate Body, but as of this
writing there appears to be little movement in that field. An intriguing
possibility is that a standing multilateral investment court—also championed
by the European Union—might in the future allow for this kind of mediated
exchange between law and politics in investment law.222 But, as of now, the
managerialist model remains an idea awaiting an institution.
VI. CONCLUSION
The foregoing discussion suggest that there is some silver lining to the
disruption of the WTO Appellate Body, in that it provides an opportunity to
rethink the relationship between trade and other vital interests. The rapid
expansion of “security” into new areas, such as economic self-sufficiency,
technology, and climate change, suggest a broader reconfiguration of
political values on the international stage. The collapse of the Appellate
Body, for now, might forestall an existential clash between these emerging
security interests and the demands of a liberalized economy. This pause
allows us to experiment with alternative models for managing trade-andsecurity disputes, each featuring its own blend of legal and political controls.
In this respect, further research and discussion will be critical for
reshaping trade governance in the twenty-first century, and many areas need
further study. To take just one example, the foregoing discussion has touched
only indirectly on the mechanisms in domestic and regional law for
managing the clash between trade and emerging security interests. As
Kathleen Claussen notes, these mechanisms—such as statutory emergency
powers, trade sanctions, export controls, and investment screening—are
undergoing their own reconfiguration.223 Future work will be important to
understanding how changing understandings of trade and security at the
national level reflect or conflict with the changing shape of global economic
governance.

221.
222.
process
law).
223.

Heath, supra note 5, at 1093–96.
Id. at 1095; cf. Roberts & St. John, supra note 4 (suggesting that a key lesson of the UNCITRAL
is the utility of having a centralized forum for the discussion of systemic issues in investment
For a discussion and research agenda, see Claussen, supra note 22.

